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ABSTRACT: This article considers the fair use doctrine as it applies to Google's
Library Search Project and both predicts and advocates for a finding of fair use. Part I
briefly reviews the past by considering the pertinent history of the fair use doctrine. It
also explains the details of the current suit over Google's Library Project. Part II moves
on to consider the current state of fair use analysis by reviewing 110 fair use cases and
conducting simple statistical analyses. It then explains and applies the fair use doctrine
to Google's project. Part III considers cases frequently compared to Google's and dis-
cusses their impact on Google's lawsuit. Part IV departs from a Google-centered analy-
sis and examines the possible future of the four factors by suggesting modifications to
the fair use doctrine.
CITATION: Brian Sites, Google the Gozerian and Fair Use Slimed: Copyright Again
in the Technocrat's Den, 47 Jurimetrics J. 31- 87 (2006).
"Gozer the Gozerian, Gozer the Destructor, Volguus Zildrohar, the Traveler,
has come!"I
In the 1984 classic motion picture Ghostbusters, the near end of the world
for downtown New York City came in the form of a three-hundred foot tall
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Gillund, Dr. Susan Clayton, and Dr. Jon Klick. This note is dedicated to Loren Richard Sites,
1922-2006.
1. GHOSTBUSTERS (Columbia Pictures 1984). Though many Internet scripts are inaccurate
for this area of the film; an accurate version may be found at Ghostbusters, http://www.angelfire.
com/tx3/80schild/ghostbusters .html (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
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Stay Puft Marshmallow Man. Sometimes bad things come in good packages.
Twenty-two years later, some critics assert that yet another friendly packaged
evil draws near and that the copyright end of the world for millions of authors
is at hand. Who is the Copyright Destructor? The Internet search giant Google.
Allegedly the harbinger of mass copyright infringement, Google faces multiple
lawsuits over its recent Library and Book Search Projects.2 What is the future
for Google's aggressive projects? What would a ruling against Google really
mean for copyright law and the Web? These answers and others lie down the
path of the fair use doctrine and deep within the technocrat's den.3
I. THE PAST: THE HISTORY OF FAIR USE
AND GOOGLE'S LIBRARY PROJECT
Several commentators have already explained the rich history of the fair
use doctrine and its English roots.4 However, addressing innovative copyright
issues merits repeating some of that history. This part briefly reviews the past,
explains Google's controversial projects, and outlines the basics of the law-
suits.
A. Fair Use Roots
Fair Use is an integral part of United States copyright law, both currently
and historically. 5 The doctrine of fair use is over 250 years old 6 and is no
stranger to the United States Supreme Court.7 Throughout its history it has
remained mutable and courts have rejected attempts to adopt bright-line tests,
2. Google's two projects are heavily interrelated and yet distinct. Google Book Search scans
books submitted by rights holders into a database that Internet users can search. A user can type in
any word or phrase on Google Book Search's search engine and find books that contain that word
or phrase. Google Library Project feeds the Book Search database using books scanned in from
major libraries that have partnered with Google. Because the rights holders have not necessarily
given Google permission to use the works that the libraries provide, this use invokes copyright
concerns. See further discussion infra Part II.B.
3. Technocrat - "an adherent of technocracy... a technical expert." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1283 (11 th ed. 2003).
4. See, e.g., 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05
(2006) (discussing fair use generally); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv.
L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1990) (citing WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT
LAw 6-17 (1st ed. 1985)).
5. A search in the LexisNexis Genfed Library, Courts File using the term "atleast25(fairuse)
[atleast5(copyright)" returns 205 cases. Use of the search connector "atleast25" restricts search
results to those that use the term at least 25 times and ensures return of "only documents that
contain an in-depth discussion on a topic." LexisNexis, Search Tips, http://web.lexis.comlhelpl
research/connectframeset.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
6. Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 44 (C.C. Mass. 1869) (using for the first time the phrase
"defence of a fair use") (internal quotations omitted); Folsom v. Marsh, 9. F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.
Mass. 1841) (discussing the elements of fair use later adopted into 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000)); Gyles
v. Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (discussing "fair abridgement").
7. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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favoring instead its preservation as "an equitable rule of reason."' 8 It is pre-
cisely this flexibility, emphasizing "case-by-case analysis," 9 that has allowed
fair use to retain the same four factor test discussed at the rule's common law
christening in 1841.10 However, this flexibility has also resulted in unpredict-
able application" and has led some to call for modification of the fair use
analysis. 12
Copyright was born in the English Statute of Anne of 1710.1' In the
course of the next nearly 300 years, the doctrine of fair use developed in Eng-
land 14 and the United States and is now enshrined in the copyright statutes of
both countries.' 5 The purpose of copyright was to ensure that the public would
continue to benefit from advances in the arts and sciences.' 6 Copyright also
protects against "the Ruin of [authors] and their Families" by copyright
infringement. 17
Beyond this historical context, applying the purpose of copyright is prob-
lematic. It is difficult to separate the ends of copyright (promoting knowledge)
from the means (rewarding authors).' 8 While authors surely produce for rea-
sons other than remuneration, there is some force in the ancient claim that
"nobody but a blockhead ever wrote except for money."'19 If we accept that
8. Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Sony, 464
U.S. at 448).
9. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561.
10. Courts had spoken of fair use prior to 1841 under the term "fair abridgement." See
generally Gyles, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. at 489-90. The first clear elucidation of a fair use test came
in Folsom, and the same factors discussed are codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107. The court stated that it
was necessary to "look to the nature and objects of the selections made [(Factors I and 2 of § 107
(the "purpose and character of the use" and "the nature of the copyrighted work"))], the quantity
and value of the materials used [(Factor 3 of § 107 ("the amount and substantiality of the portion
used"))], and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work [(Factor 4 of § 107 ("the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work"))] ...." Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348.
11. See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.05.
12. Judge Kozinski is one such example: "I really don't think that any theoretical fine-tuning
of fair use doctrine is going to solve the problem. In fact, tonight I'm going to modestly propose
that when it comes to derivative works, fair-use doctrine is a red-herring and we should just dump
it." Alex Kozinski, What's So Fair About Fair Use?: The 1999 Donald C. Brace Memorial
Lecture, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 513, 515 (1999).
13. Copyright Act, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
14. WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 6-18 (2d ed. 1995).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 107; Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 29-30 (U.K.).
16. The first United States copyright statute stated it was "for the encouragement of
learning." Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
17.8 Ann., c. 19.
18. See generally, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH.
L.REV. 1197 (1995) (discussing the asserted purposes of copyright and their limited utility).
19. This quote is attributed to Dr. Samuel Johnson and is available at: Quotable Quotes on
Writers and Writing (Feb. 9, 2006), http://www.logicalcreativity.com/jon/quotes.html#j.
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remuneration is necessary to encourage new creations20 then it immediately
becomes clear that the means and ends are inseparable: if we truly want to
promote new creations (the ends) we must necessarily pay authors (promote
the means). The "spirit" of copyright, however, offers little guidance in
practice: how are courts to balance the two when they are inextricably
linked?
21
In some ways the spirit of copyright law has, however, helped Congress
and courts produce a tool for balancing remuneration against progress: the fair
use doctrine.22 Fair use is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107 and requires that courts
23
apply a four factor test to each case. While courts have rarely complained it
offers too little guidance, 24 leading scholars have criticized § 107 as vague
concerning how to apply and how to balance the four factors in the aggre-
gate.25 This claim finds support in the courts as well: for example, in two of its
three major fair use decisions, the Supreme Court split and all three cases have
been reversed on each appeal.26 The resulting unpredictability 27 is undesirable
but, given the desire to preserve a "case-by-case determination" 28 there may be
no alternatives.
20. It is unclear if this assumption is as forceful as it is often made to appear. History is
replete with instances of hobbyists creating great masterpieces. In fact, responding to Dr.
Johnson's quote, supra note 19, Thomas Green said: "Instead of marveling with Johnson, how
anything but profit should incite men to literary labor, I am rather surprised that mere emolument
should induce them to labor so well." Quotable Quotes on Writers and Writing (Feb. 9, 2006),
http://www.logicalcreativity.com/jon/quotes.html#green. Regardless of whether remuneration is
required to encourage new works, at least some of the protections copyright law affords extend
beyond what encouraging new works requires. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 18, at 1225-26 (arguing
that architectural design protection does not promote new architecture).
21. "Thus, CBS contends, the public benefit gained from the encouragement of historical and
biographical works outweighed the copyright owner's interest in this case." Roy Export Co.
Establishment of Vaduz, Liechtenstein, Black Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 503 F. Supp.
1137, 1143-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (intemal citations omitted).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
23. The four factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id.
24. Leval, supra note 4, at 1106.
25. See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.05.
26. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (no split); Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (6-3 decision); Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (5-4 decision); N1MMER & NIMMER, supra note
4, § 13.105, at 13-156 to -157 & nn.1 0-12 (noting that each of the three cases was reversed at each
level of appeal).
27. See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.05.
28. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549.
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Throughout the development of copyright it has been technological
advance that has led to substantial modifications of fair use. 29 From the begin-
ning of copyright, courts recognized the importance of applying existing judi-
cial doctrine cautiously to technological innovations. 30 History teaches that, to
be effective, courts must tread carefully in the technocrat's den; if they are
overly restrictive, they may inhibit progress. 31 Alternatively, if courts are too
permissive, their rulings may not effectively prevent infringement. 32 Finding
the appropriate midpoint has proven difficult.
B. Google Book Search and Google Library
Google is the most popular search engine in the United States.33 Its name
has become synonymous with searching the Internet 34 and, largely through the
advertising revenues it generates on its search engine page, 35 Google has been
very successful. 36 The company's self-proclaimed goal is to make all of the
world's information searchable.37 As part of this mission, Google announced
the Book Search project in October 2004 . Using the Book Search database,
searchers can query the actual text of all the books in the database, in a manner
similar to searching the Web. Books are included in the Book Search Project
29. For a discussion of the development of copyright, see the sources listed supra note 4.
30. "[W]hile I shall think myself bound to secure every man in the enjoyment of his copy-
right, one must not put manacles upon science." Carey v. Kearsley, (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681
(K.B.).
31. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 431. Explaining the need for caution in considering new
technologies, especially when guidance from Congress is lacking, the Court stated, "[iun a case
like this, in which Congress has not plainly marked our course, we must be circumspect in
construing the scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which never contemplated such a
calculus of interests." Id.
32. Siva Vaidhyanathan, Supreme Court's Unsound Decision, SALON.COM, June 28, 2005,
http://dir.salon.comlstory/news/feature2005/06/28/grokster/index-np.html (concluding that the
Supreme Court erred in Grokster and that it will stifle technology).
33. Danny Sullivan, Nielsen NetRatings Search Engine Ratings, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH,
Aug. 22, 2006, http://searchenginewatch.com/showPage.html?page=2156451.
34. Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/google (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
35. While Google is a diverse company, offering a range of services, the majority of its
revenue comes from advertising. See, e.g., Google Investor Relations, Google Announces Third
Quarter Fiscal 2005 Results, http://investor.google.com/releases/2005Q3- eamings-google.pdf
(last visited Oct. 27, 2006).
36. See, e.g., id.
37. Google Corporate Information, Company Overview, http://www.google.comcorporate
index.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2006) ("Google's mission is to organize the world's information
and make it universally accessible and useful.")
38. Google Book Search, News & Views, http://books.google.comgooglebooks/newsviews/
history.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2006). The Google Book Search service was previously named
"Google Print" and is directly connected to their Library Project. Because of their integrated
nature in the lawsuit, the title "Google Book Search" is used to refer to the partnering with the
Library Project that manifests in the Google Book Search Web site. As discussed infra, this Part,
libraries that have partnered with Google are also making their books available to Google. Once
scanned under the Library Project, the books are included in the Book Search database.
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when publishers submit copies of their works to be scanned and included.39
Once a user types in a search, a list of the books containing the search phrase
is displayed on the screen. By clicking on these books, the context of the
phrase's use in that book is viewable. How much context is provided depends
on two factors: the copyright status of the book, and, if it is still under copy-
right, how much the rights holder has given permission to display. Under the
Book Search Project, because books are only provided by publishers, the
scope of this permission is easily negotiable. 40 Though Google has not been
entirely forthcoming on how many books are currently included, some have
speculated it includes over 10,000.
41
Google describes the purpose of Google Book Search as "to help you dis-
cover books and learn where to buy or borrow them, not read them online
from start to finish. It's like going to a bookstore and browsing-with a
Google twist. '42 To avoid cover-to-cover browsing, Google has implemented
several security protocols. For example, unless a book is in the public domain
or a publisher has given permission to do so, searchers are not able to view the
full text of the book. Instead, only snippets-no more than three sentences-
are viewable. Google calls this "Snippet View" and analogizes it to a card
catalog.43 Once a user has identified whether the book is one she needs, Book
Search also lists links that assist in obtaining the book, either through a library
or through a vendor that sells it.
The Book Search Project is, according to Google, very secure as the
scanned documents are stored on Google's "secure servers." 44 To use Book
Search, the searcher must be signed in to Google, which requires having an
account. Creating an account requires providing a current email address, pass-
word, completing a word verification, and agreeing to the Terms of Service.
Additionally, Google states in its Digital Millennium Copyright Act restric-
tions policy that it will terminate the accounts of "repeat [copyright] infring-
39. Google Book Search, About Google Book Search, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/
about.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2006). See also Wikipedia, Google Book Search, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/GooglePrint (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
40. Google Book Search, About Google Book Search, supra note 39.
41. Wikipedia, supra note 39. Noticeably, Wikipedia neither provides a citation for this, nor
is it clear which of the authors contributing to Wikipedia added it. As of June 2006, personal
correspondence with Wikipedia by the author indicates they are working on this error. Email from
Michelle Kinney, Volunteer, Wikipedia, to author (June 17, 2006 03:06:00 EST) (on file with
author).
42. Google Book Search, Google Book Search Help Center, Why Can't I Read the Entire
Book?, http://books.google.comsupport/bin/answer.py?answer=43729 (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
43. Google Book Search, About Google Book Search, supra note 39.
44. Google Book Search, Authors: Common Questions, http://books.google.com/google
books/author-faq.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2006).
45. A "word verification" is a process of displaying oddly shaped words or numbers,
sometimes overlayed with lines of different colors or shapes. Blogger, Help: What Is the Word
Verification Option?, http://help.blogger.com/bin/answer.py?answer=42520 (last visited Nov. 20,
2006). The user types the letters or numbers displayed with the lines into a box and, if they are
entered correctly, the user passes the test. Id. Because they require a human being's visual skills to
decipher, their primary design is to avoid spain or programs that create accounts automatically. Id.
Word verification is becoming increasingly common on the Web. Id.
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ers" in "appropriate circumstances." 46 Google also points out on its "Common
Questions" page under "Author Help" that, unless a publisher instructs other-
wise, the copy, save, and print functions are disabled when viewing pages of
the books on Google Book Search.47
Google Book Search is a for-profit enterprise. Advertisement space on the
results pages provides the financial fuel for the project, and Google shares this
revenue with participating rights holders.48 Google also shares search data with
the publisher, letting it know how popular its book is on Google Book
Search.49
Despite this voluntary sharing of benefits with rights holders, Google
Book Search suffers from a core weakness: it depends on publishers to submit
works to Google. Under the Google Book Search Model, the burden of helping
to create a comprehensive Internet library would be on the collective rights
holders-literally millions of authors and publishers throughout the world. The
Google Library Project, on the other hand, reverses this burden, which allows
the database to grow much faster.
On December 14, 2004, Google announced a plan to create a massive
searchable database: the Library Project. 50 The Library Project is a partnership
among the University of Michigan, Harvard University, The New York Public
Library, Stanford University, Oxford University, and Google.5 1 Through the
partnership, Google will digitize every title in each of the five libraries' col-
lections and, in return, the libraries will receive an electronic copy of the
works Google scanned from that library's collection.52 The search features of
the Google Book Search database will remain unchanged in the Library Pro-
ject: users will still not be able to see more than three sentences of copyright-
protected works unless the publisher has given Google permission, and adver-
tising revenue will still be shared with participating publishers. 53 However, the
burden is placed on copyright holders to "opt out" of the program if they wish
that their works not be a part of the database. 54 Opting out requires that the
copyright holder identify herself as such, provide contact information, an
email address, and a password.55
46. Google, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, http://books.google.con/booksdmca.html
(last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
47. Google Book Search, Authors: Common Questions, supra note 44.
48. Google Book Search, Google Book Search Help Center, How Much Will I Earn?, http://
books.google.com/support/partner/bin/answer.py?answer=-17894&topic=333 (last visited Oct. 29,
2006).
49. Google Book Search, Information for Publishers and Authors about the Library Project,
http://books.google.conmgoogleprint/publisherIlibrary.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
50. Press Release, Google, Google Checks Out Library Books (Dec. 14, 2004), http://www.
google.com/press/pressrel/print-library.html.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Google Book Search, Information for Publishers and Authors about the Library Project,
supra note 49.
54. See, e.g., Google Book Search, Library Project Exclusion Registration, https://books.
google.com/partner/exclusion-signup (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
55. Id.
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In summary, while the Library Project and Book Search Project are dis-
tinct entities, they heavily interrelate. The distinction is simple: the Library
Project involves scanning books into a database, whereas the Book Search
Project takes that database, integrates in any display preferences for partici-
pating publishers, and allows users to search the text of the scanned books.
Thus, technically, it is the Library Project that invokes copyright concerns, as
it involves actual copying without explicit authorization from the copyright
owner. But because the Book Search Project does the actual searching and
users click into the service under links named "Google Book Search," this
article refers to the Google Book Search Project as the subject of the lawsuit.
Google's projects have not been without detractors. The Authors Guild56
and the Association of American Publishers57 have both filed suit in the South-
ern District of New York.58 Google has also drawn criticism from the Associa-
tion of American University Presses59 while simultaneously attracting
competition in the book-searching market. 60 Because it is undisputed that
Google is making a complete copy of the copyright-protected works and that
copying is one of the enumerated exclusive rights granted by § 106,61 Google
62
will have to rely on some defense. Likely, that defense will be fair use. The
ability to search all of the world's books in the foreseeable future may thus
hinge on whether Google's use is in fact "fair."63
56. Press Release, Authors Guild, Authors Guild Sues Google, Citing "Massive Copyright
Infringement" (Sept. 20, 2005), http://www.authorsguild.org/news/sues-google-citing.htm.
57. Press Release, Ass'n of Am. Publishers, Publishers Sue Google Over Plans to Digitize
Books (Oct. 19, 2005), http://publishers.org/press/releases.cfm?PressReleaseArticlelD=292.
58. The Authors Guild complaint is available at http://wendy.seltzer.org/media/AuthorsGuild
-v-Google.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2006). The Association of American Publishers complaint is
available at http://publishers.org/press/pdf/40%20McGraw-Hill%20v.%2OGoogle.pdf (last visited
Oct. 19, 2006). See infra Part II.A for a discussion on MP3.com, another case in this area.
59. Ass'n of Am. Univ. Presses, Google Book Search nde Google Print, http://aaupnet.org/
aboutup/issues/gprint.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006).
60. A9.com, an Amazon.com search engine, already offers "Search Inside the Book." See
Amazon.com, Search Inside the Book, http://www.amazon.com/Search-Inside-Books/b?le=UTF8
&node=10197021(last visited Nov. 14, 2006). Yahoo.com has recently joined the book-searching
market, although its version will search only public domain works. See Elinor Mills, Yahoo To
Digitize Public Domain Books, CNET News.com, Oct. 2, 2005, http://news.com.com/Yahoo+to+
digitize+public+domain+books/2100-1038_3-5887374.html. Microsoft has also entered the book-
searching arena via its MSN Book Search, set to launch in 2006. Katie Hafner, Microsoft to Offer
Online Book-Content Searches, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 26, 2005, at C6 [hereinafter Hafner, Microsoft to
Offer].
61. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
62. It is unlikely Google will defend with the other traditional defenses used in copyright.
See discussion infra Part ILD; see also Elisabeth Hanratty, Note, Google Library: Beyond Fair
Use?, 2005 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 10 (2005) (concluding, unlike this article, that Google's use is
not a fair use); infra note 180 (discussing other possible defenses that could be raised).
63. See infra Part llI.B (discussing alternative approaches to Google's present plan).
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II. THE PRESENT: THE FOUR FACTORS OF
GOOGLE'S COPYRIGHT END OF THE WORLD64
Under § 107, the court will apply four nonexclusive factors to determine
whether Google's copying is a fair use. The four factors examine: (1) the pur-
pose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the works used, (3) the amount
of the works used, and (4) the impact on the market by the infringing use. The
factors, however, are not given equal weight in the analysis. This part consid-
ers the historical weight of each factor using basic statistical analysis, and then
turns to applying the four factors to Google's Book Search Project.
A. How Courts Consider the Four Factors:
Frequency and Correlation Data
Courts have given the four factors different weights throughout the history
of fair use analysis. While courts have sometimes explicitly stated that differ-
ent factors receive more weight than others, other times factors theoretically
given great weight do not parallel the final verdict. So what are courts basing
decisions on? To paint a quantitative picture, I statistically analyzed 110 fair
use cases to produce frequency65 and correlation data.66 The correlation data
results, presented to parallel the method employed by Professor David
Nimmer, supplements the frequency data and is displayed below.
6 7
64. See Hannibal Travis, Building Universal Digital Libraries: An Agenda for Copyright
Reform, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 761, 814-19 (2006) (arguing that a proper interpretation of fair use
would permit the Google Book Search Project, but fearing that narrow judicial application in
recent cases would condemn it).
65. Frequency was analyzed by listing the possible factor-combination and holding
scenarios, as Table 2 shows, and counting the number of times each combination occurred. For the
frequency analysis, only "victory" on a factor was counted, because a court ruling the factor as
neutral does not have a necessarily straight-forward meaning. Thus, the frequency table below
reflects the number of times: 1) "fair use" was concluded, with the court citing the factors listed as
supporting it, and 2) "unfair" use was concluded, with the court citing the factors listed as
supporting it.
66. A correlation analysis reveals how things are related to each other. For example, you
might say that ice cream sales are correlated with hot weather, meaning that as the temperature
outside increased, ice cream sales would also increase. Correlations are measured on a scale from
"-I" to "I". A "-I" means that for every one step variable X takes forward, variable Y takes
exactly one step backwards. A "I" means that for every step X takes forward, Y takes exactly one
step forward. Correlation does not demonstrate causation. In other words, although it reveals the
two things being studied are related, it does not mean that the hot weather is really what makes ice
cream sales go up. It could be, for example, that more ice cream trucks are circulating in
neighborhoods in the summer.
67. David Nimmer, "Fairest of Them All" and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 263, 280 (2003). Correlations are presented demonstratively here because,
strictly speaking, this data is not linear, it is categorical. Thus, it violates the assumptions of
correlation statistics. However, continuity (linearity) can be roughly assumed between "Unfair,"
"Neutral," and "Fair," in parallel to using correlations on other categorical data such as Likert
scales. Finally, it is not that far-fetched to suspect that, in the mind of judges handling copyright
claims, "Unfair," "Neutral," and "Fair" occurs in a "-I to I" type "continuous" scale.
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Table 168 shows a sample of the cases used as raw data for the analysis; the
full table and statistics are available in Appendix A.
FOUR FAIR USE FACTORS AND HOLDING
CASE
Name and Citation (1) Purpose (2) Fact (3) Amount (4) Effect on Holding
& Character vs. Fiction Used the potential
of Use market
American
Geophysical Union UNFAIR FAIR UNFAIR UNFAIR UNFAIR
v. Texaco, Inc.,
60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir.
1994).
Sega Enterprises, UNFAIR UNFAIR UNFAIR UNFAIR UNFAIR
Ltd. v. Maphia,
948 F. Supp. 923
(W.D. Mich. 1994).
Robinson v. UNFAIR FAIR UNFAIR UNFAIR UNFAIR
Random House,
Inc., 877 F. Supp.
679 (N.D. Cal.
1995).
Metro-Goldwyn- UNFAIR UNFAIR FAIR FAIR UNFAIR
Mayer, Inc. v.
American Honda
Motor Co., 900 F.
Supp. 1287 (C.D.
Cal. 1995).
Table 1. Excerpt from full Table of Cases results.
68. This table and analysis is facially similar to Professor Nimmer's table in "Fairest of
Them All" and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, but it is functionally quite different. Id. at 269-77.
This table shows the court's conclusion on each factor and its subsequent holding; "NEUTRAL"
indicates the court concluded the factor favored neither party. Nimmer's table shows the
conclusions he believed the court should have reached. Id. at 282 n.70 ("As previously noted, the
chart does not track the analysis actually employed in fair use cases....") For example, for Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., Nimmer's table lists Factor 1 as "FAIR,"
while, as this table notes, the court concluded it was "UNFAIR," saying "[o]n balance Plaintiffs
should prevail on this issue .... 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1300 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
This table comes from examining 110 fair use cases and reviewing the pertinent sections to
objectively ascertain as best as possible the court's stated conclusion on each factor. Because the
purpose of the table is to illuminate what courts are doing, it includes cases of every sort; in this
way, it is again similar to Nimmer's table (which also included such cases). Id. at 278 ("First, the
obligatory disclaimers. Every column in the chart is controversial .... ).
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Table 2 reveals the frequency analysis results for the 110 cases:
Frequency Data
COURT CONCLUDES
USE IS
Fair Use TOTAL
Factor FAIR & Cumulative Cumulative
Combinations FAIR USE UNFAIR USE UNFAIR FAIR UNFAIR
# % # % # % 51 # 50
1 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 51 50
2 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 22 35
3 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 33 48
4 2 3.64% 0 0.00% 2 1.82% 53 49
12 1 1.82% 1 1.82% 2 1.82%
13 0 0.00% 3 5.45% 3 2.73%
14 9 16.36% 1 1.82% 10 9.09%
23 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
24 1 1.82% 2 3.64% 3 2.73%
34 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
123 1 1.82% 2 3.64% 3 2.73%
124 9 16.36% 3 5.45% 12 10.91%
134 22 40.00% 16 29.09% 38 34.55%
234 1 1.82% 3 5.45% 4 3.64%
1234 9 16.36% 24 43.64% 33 30.00%
Totals 55 100.00% 55 100.00% 110 100.00%
Table 2. Frequency data and number of times each factor combination
paralleled final holding. See note 65 for a description of frequency analysis.
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Essentially, Table 2 shows how often lawsuit parties won or lost overall
based on a particular combination of the four fair use factors. The factor com-
binations listed down the far-left side of the table were cited by the court as
supporting a finding of fair use the number of times listed under the "FAIR
USE" column, and cited as supporting a finding of unfair use the number of
times listed under the "UNFAIR USE" column. The "TOTAL FAIR &
UNFAIR" column lists the number of times the factors were cited to support
whatever conclusion the court came to: basically, it adds the prior columns
together for a "big picture." Finally, the last two columns, partially grayed out,
list the number of times a single factor was cited as matching the end result.
For example, under this column, Factor 1-looking at all the possible combi-
nations it occurs in-was cited 51 times to support a "fair use" conclusion and
50 times to support an "unfair use" conclusion. 69 But what do these numbers
tell us?
The data show that, not surprisingly, Factors 1 and 4 are the most com-
monly cited "victory" factors (under the CUMULATIVE columns). This
roughly equates to saying they are given the most weight in the overall analy-
sis. Additionally, the table shows the frequency with which factors are used to
reach a conclusion: in the fair use and unfair use contexts, the "134" combina-
tion is common, showing again the relative unimportance of Factor 2. Some-
what surprisingly, it also shows that "shutouts" (winning all factors) occurs
more in the unfair use context than the fair use context. While the data cannot
explain the reason, we can speculate that because fair use is a defense, it is
applied more carefully when uses are objectively unfair than when they are
objectively fair.70 Finally, the table also shows perhaps the most interesting
result of the analysis: the only factor that a user has won and still successfully
claimed a fair use, despite losing all other factors, is Factor 4.
The raw data from the 110 cases can also be used to find correlations
between the variables (the four factors and the court's holding). Coding fair as
"1," neutral as "0" and unfair as "-1," I correlated the case holdings to each
factor, as summarized in Table 3:71
69. These numbers were obtained by counting each factor combination that included Factor
1, then Factor 2, and so on.
70. In other words, if a use really is fair, the court should have no trouble concluding the
copyright holder should not be compensated. Because after all, if the use is fair, the rights holder
is not entitled to compensation. But, when a use is not fair, the court would be inclined to swiftly
strike it down, because it inappropriately risks defeating the copyright holder's valid expectation
of compensation.
71. See Appendix B to view the data used for correlation in Table 3.
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Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Holding
Factor I I
Factor 2 0.075836 1
Factor 3 0.633896 -0.0581 1
Factor 4 0.734191 0.105194 0.558622 1
Holding 0.862567 0.170504 0.604598 0.874028 1
Table 3. Correlation between Fair Use Factors and Court Holdings
Table 3 shows that Factor 1 and Factor 4, represented by the "Factor"
columns, are most correlated with the court's conclusion, represented by the
"Holding" entry, in fair use cases. This indicates that, when a court finds that
Factors 1 or 4 support fair use, that court is likely to find the use fair; and con-
versely, when the court finds that Factors 1 or 4 support a determination of
unfair use, that court is also likely to conclude that the use is unfair overall.
This is not surprising, as there are multiple instances in which the fair use
analysis expressly turned on either Factors 1 or 4.72 It is also largely congruent
with the spirit of copyright law because it weights most heavily the right to
compensation (Factor 4) and the benefit to the public (Factor 1).73
Somewhat surprisingly, Factors 1 and 4 are on relatively equal ground
statistically. This result is odd given the Supreme Court's statement that Factor
4 is to be given the most weight among the factors. 74 The results also show
that Factor 2 is weakly predictive in the fair use analysis. This is, again, not a
foreign sentiment in court opinions.75 To a lesser extent, Factor 3 is also not a
strong predictor when juxtaposed with Factors 1 and 4. Nevertheless, the cor-
relation data show Factor 3's weight as surprisingly high, demonstrating that
Factor 2 is the weak factor and suggesting that Factor 3 may play more of a
role in the analysis than the court opinions give it credit for.76 Finally, the
statistics show that Factors 1, 3, and 4 are correlated with each other.
The statistics, more generally, offer insight into how previous cases have
been decided and into how courts are treating each factor in the decision-
making process. They show that the Supreme Court's emphasis on Factor 4
has not been overlooked by lower courts. In showing the strong link between
Factor I and Holding, they also provide some support for putting Factor 1 on
the same level as Factor 4 analytically. Finally, the statistics provide additional
reason to examine the current test that calls for balancing the factors. What
72. Compare, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579-85 (1994), and
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1998) (both focusing on
Factor I in two parody cases) with Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
566-69 (1985) (focusing on Factor 4 as the most important).
73. This is particularly true when Factor I includes an analysis of societal benefit. See
discussion infra this Part. Factor I also reflects the importance of whether the accused work is
transformative, which is an important aspect of the social benefit that the fair use doctrine is
designed to promote.
74. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539.
75. See discussion infra this Part.
76. But see discussion about causation vs. correlation infra this Part.
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utility does Factor 2 really have in such a balancing if it is weighted so
weakly? Isn't saying that creative works get additional protection wholly
vacuous if courts are not really giving them such protections? And if the
strength of Factor 3 is also somewhat weak comparatively, should its role in
the analysis change?
What don't the statistics show? In a word: causality. Both the frequency
and correlation analyses-all statistics in fact-do not prove a causal link
between variables. So here, it remains entirely possible, as has been suggested
elsewhere,77 that courts simply reach the conclusion they think they should
reach, then align the factors to support it. This theory might explain, for
instance, Factor 3's surprisingly high correlation to "Holding" in Table 3,
because it asks if the amount used was "in proportion to," and also whether it
was a "necessary" amount: very malleable standards. 8 It might also explain
the high correlation between Factors 1, 3, and 4. We hope it is not true that
judges fit the reasoning to the result they secretly seek, because this is not
what the four factors are designed to do. Nevertheless, even assuming judges
adhere to the purpose of the factors and rigorously work through each to find
the result, the statistics still cannot truly show causation. They can and do,
however, paint a quantitative picture of a largely qualitative phenomenon.
B. Google's Use
In applying the four fair use factors to Google's use, the court should find:
(1) that Factor 1 favors Google because, despite being commercial, Google's
use is highly transformative and of great public benefit; (2) that the second
factor favors neither party strongly but may lean towards Google because the
works (both creative and factual) are used in a nontraditional manner; (3) that
the third factor favors Google because the copying of entire works is propor-
tional to the project's requirements and; (4) that the fourth factor favors
Google because the derivative works test favors fair use as the database in no
way supersedes the original and Google's use is not in a traditional or reason-
able derivative market. However, as discussed above, the analysis will likely
focus primarily on the first and fourth factors.
77. Nimmer, supra note 67.
By now, we have come far enough to realize that, pious words notwithstanding, it is largely a fairy
tale to conclude that the four factors determine resolution of concrete fair use cases .... The clash
of the nine justices themselves in Harper & Row demonstrates that jurists up to the Supreme Court
level feel the need to align the factors unanimously in favor of the desired result, perceiving that
any deviation could be a fatal chink in the armor.
Id. Additionally, the statistics cannot explain the possibility Nimmer suggests that there are even
cases where the clear result is that all four factors favor one result, yet the court reaches exactly
the opposite. Id. at 282-83.
78. After all, if the use is not fair, taking any is too much. If the use is fair, taking the entire
work is sometimes permissible. See infra Part II.E for additional discussion on the analysis of
Factor 3.
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C. Factor 1: The Purpose and Character of the Use
1. Background to Factor 1
Factor I requires an analysis of "the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit edu-
cational purposes., 79 The preamble to § 107 lists several examples of uses
likely to be determined as fair.80 Unfortunately, no further guidance on what
purposes and uses might otherwise qualify as fair is given. Courts have
addressed this factor by considering four different elements of "the purpose
and character of the use": 81 (1) whether the infringing use is commercial, (2)
the defendant's behavior, (3) whether the use is transformative, and (4) the
public benefit of the project. 82 Though complex, this analysis is important
because, as the statistics above illuminate, Factor 1 is one of the two most
influential fair use prongs.
Courts once held that a commercial use is presumptively unfair. 83 How-
ever, the Supreme Court has subsequently retreated from this position, recog-
nizing that this would "swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses" in the stat-
ute's preamble as they, too, are often commercial. 84 The commercial nature
may still lean towards a finding of unfair use if the use is exploitative of the
copyright "without paying the customary price." 85 Or, as the Ninth Circuit has
phrased it, if the use is "not highly exploitative, the commercial nature of the
use weighs only slightly against a finding of fair use."
86
Under Factor 1, courts also consider the "propriety of the defendant's con-
duct.",87 Prior to Campbell, some critics called consideration of defendant's
conduct a "false factor," employed simply to justify the court's ruling.88 But in
Harper & Row, the Court recognized that "[flair use presupposes good faith
and fair dealing" and a finding of bad faith weighs against a finding of fair
use. 89 One such example is Rogers v. Koons, where an artist tore a copyright
notice off a note card depicting a photo before sending the photo to a lab to be
the basis of a sculpture. 90 The defendant did this, presumably, so the lab would
be willing to create the sculpture he had commissioned. The court found this
79. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
80. The preamble lists such likely fair uses as: "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
.scholarship, or research . I... d. Though not dispositive, it is interesting to note that Google's
service strongly promotes research and would be very useful to several other listed fair uses.
81. Id.
82. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing
element 4); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.05[A[l1][b][dj (discussing elements 1-3).
83. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
84. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (citing J. Brennan's
dissent in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 592 (1985).
85. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
86. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818.
87. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.05[A]).
88. Leval, supra note 4, at 1125-26.
89. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (citing Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp.
130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)) (internal quotations omitted).
90. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 305 (2d Cir. 1992).
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evidenced bad faith, supporting the conclusion that Factor 1 weighed against
him. 91 But the inquiry into bad faith is not always so simple. For example, bad
faith is not necessarily evidenced by lack of permission; a defendant denied
permission to use a copyright-protected work who uses it anyway is not neces-
sarily acting in bad faith.92 Ultimately, the Court's most recent consideration
of this element of Factor 1 was only brief and in a footnote, and it declined to
indicate how much weight bad faith received.93 It is thus unclear how influen-
tial the propriety of the defendant's conduct is in the aggregate fair use analy-
sis. It is clear, however, that bad faith does not favor fair use, and that good
faith, to some extent, does favor fair use.
Courts also consider whether the infringing use is "transformative. 94 A
transformative work is one that "adds value to the original ... [and uses] copy-
rightable expression . . . as raw material, transformed in the creation of new
",95information, new aesthetics, new insights and [new] understandings ....
"The central purpose of this investigation is to see ... whether the new work
merely supersedes the objects of the original creation or instead adds some-
thing new. . . [I]t asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new
work is transformative." 96 However, even with this guidance, it remains
unclear when courts will declare a work transformative. 97 This is all the more
problematic given that some courts treat "'not transformative' as a shorthand
for 'not fair,' and correlatively 'transformative' for 'fair.' 98 But, when a work
is transformative, it not only tilts Factor 1 towards "fair use," it also causes
other subfactors like commercialism to weigh less against a finding of fair
use.
99
Finally, Factor 1 sometimes involves consideration of the societal benefit
flowing from the use.1° ° Oddly, courts do not always make explicit their
consideration of the benefit society will derive from the use, but shades of this
concern color almost every discussion of fair use. When courts do directly
contemplate the benefit to the public the infringing use offers, they may
invoke it at any point in the analysis, not just under Factor 1. For example,
91. Id. at 309.
92. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 n.18 (1994).
93. Id.
94. "Transformative" was originally coined by Judge Pierre N. Leval and is similar to a
"productive use." See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.05[A][l][b], at 13-166 &
n.82.
95. Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998)
(quoting Leval, supra note 4) (internal quotations omitted).
96. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
97. NIMMER & NtMMER, supra note 4, § 13.05[A][1][b], at 13-168 to -169 (discussing
disparate holdings).
98. Id.; see also discussion and statistics of the weight of the factors supra Part H.A.
99. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
100. Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. Bleem, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir.
2000).
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while the Ninth Circuit has considered public benefit under Factor 1,1 the
Second Circuit once characterized Factor 4 as balancing "the benefit the public
will derive if the use is permitted and the personal gain the copyright owner
will receive if the use is denied." 10 2 Wherever the consideration is made, the
societal benefit analysis is useful. Because part of the purpose of copyright law
is to benefit the public, an inquiry into how much the defendant's use serves
the public is only logical. Copyright was intended to promote "the enrichment
of society,"'' 0 3 and fair use helps ensure "public benefit.' 1°4 Though courts
have not given this element much express weight, it has great utility as one of
only two considerations that speak directly to the spirit of copyright law. 1
05
2. Application to Google
The analysis here shows that Factor 1 favors Google. While Google's use
is commercial,' °6 its commercialism is outweighed by its transformative
nature. On this point alone, the factor favors a finding of "fair;" Google's
apparent good faith, fair dealing and the societal benefit of its use are
persuasive but superfluous aspects of the Factor 1 analysis. The greatest source
of debate under Factor 1 in Google's lawsuits will likely be over whether the
use is transformative.
The transformative inquiry is the bulk of the Factor I analysis, but the
precedents do not clarify exactly what is and is not transformative. Arguably,
the essence of a transformative use is one that puts the work to use in an
entirely different manner. For example, consider a fictional Google project, the
Google Caff. In Google Cafd, Google has built all of its booths, chairs and
tables out of thousands of full-color photocopies of books, bound with their
titles clearly visible; none of the books can be opened, however. 0 7 Google's
patrons are invited to eat and drink in an atmosphere of literary diversity;
drinking coffee while reclining on Catcher in the Rye or conversing around a
table built out of World Almanacs. The Caf6 Project is sued for using copy-
right-protected works in a commercial manner without copyright holders'
permission. Are Google Cafe's uses permissible? The use of the books is
transformative because, although the books were created to entertain, inform,
or appease, now they are employed as furniture-a completely different use.
Google Book Search has done the same: books once used for entertainment are
101. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818, 820 (9th Cir. 2003); Sony Computer
Entm't Am., 214 F.3d at 1027. The Ninth Circuit has also analyzed societal benefit under Factor 4.
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 804-05 (9th Cir. 2003).
102. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).
103. Leval, supra note 4, at 1I11; see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
104. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820.
105. The second is Factor 4, which contemplates economic harm, for example, remuneration
to authors.
106. The database it creates may be useful for research, criticism and comment but it is being
created to generate additional revenue for Google via advertising.
107. For the purposes of this analogy, we assume that Google photocopied the insides of the
books even though they cannot be opened.
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now used like a card catalog. The technological aspect of Google's use should
not confuse the transformativeness analysis.
But is the transformative nature of Google's use undercut by that Google
Book Search does not add new expression? The Supreme Court has never
required that a fair use add new expression, instead it has only required that a
new use add "something new, with a further purpose or different character,
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message ... [to be consid-
ered] transformative. ' ' 108 One way that a work may be transformative is if it
adds new expression, but this is not the only way. Because granting a copy-
right requires expressive elements, Google may not be able to copyright its
projects. Nevertheless, the fair use defense is still available despite the
unavailability of copyright protection itself. Google's use even advances the
examples in preamble of § 107: the database enhances scholarship and research.
The transformative inquiry thus asks whether the otherwise infringing use
is distinct from the use or purpose the copyright-protected works serve. Here,
the original purpose of the books Google is copying is entertainment and edu-
cation. Google is not duplicating these purposes because the purpose of its use
is information location. In a very literal way, Google is using the original
works as raw material which it transforms into new information.' °9 Google's
copying books into memory uses copyright-protected materials in total disre-
gard for what those materials say, stand for, invoke or represent-perhaps a
first in the history of fair use analysis. To the Google search engine, these
works are no more than an assembly of letters, a pool of words that are mean-
ingful only when a user specifies a certain subset. Google uses copyright-
protected materials in a manner wholly separate from their original and tradi-
tional purposes. Because Google's transformative use renders its commercial
status-the only element of Factor 1 that does not favor a finding of fair use-
less significant, on a transformative analysis alone Factor 1 favors Google.
Google may also find support based on the propriety of its behavior. It
appears Google has acted in good faith and has, on multiple occasions, taken
steps to accommodate those who object to its projects. 110 Google has also
resisted opportunities to compete directly with book stores and libraries by
refusing, for example, to provide downloadable or printable copies of docu-
ments that are in the public domain."' The issue therefore comes down to
whether Google's continuance despite lack of permission, and the opting-out
requirement that Google imposes on copyright holders indicate bad faith.
108. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). But see
Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussed infra Part 1fl.B).
109. Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (1998) (citing
Leval, supra note 4).
110. One such occasion is Google's allowing copyright holders to "opt out" of Google's
Library Print Project. See Press Release, ArriveNet, Google Print Library Position "Backwards"
(Aug. 25, 2005), http://press.arrivenet.com/education/anicle.php/685666.html (arguing copyright
holders should not have to opt out).
11. Interview by Knud Bohle with Jens Redmer, Google Book Search Europe, in Hamburg,
Germany (Nov. 23, 2005), http://www.indicare.org/tiki-read-article.php?articleld=153 ("We will
neither put Libraries nor Publishers out of business.").
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While the lack of permission claim is legally unsound," 2 the opting-out
criticism is not as obviously so. It is a fair criticism that forcing copyright
owners to opt out to protect their works is generally inappropriate. Tangible
property owners do not have to opt out to render illegal the unauthorized use
of the property by others. Of course, if there is no infringement, there is noth-
ing to be protected from. If the use is fair independent of the opt out, then
opting out is a chance for copyright holders to stop Google's use of the work,
even though Google's use would be entirely legal. If the use is fair without an
opt out, it shows that the opt out favors fair use and therefore cannot work
against Google under a good-faith analysis. Moreover, a good faith analysis
inquires into what parties actually believed. It is thus Google's intent that is
most relevant to evaluating the propriety of its behavior.
Google does not appear to have offered the opt-out option because it
believed it was inappropriately using copyright-protected materials; it seems to
have offered it in an attempt to resolve disagreement or as a courtesy. Google
has certainly maintained that it believes its actions constitute fair use. But
how will the court treat it? In similar analyses, courts have refused to penalize
defendants whose request for permission to use a work was denied." 4 The
principle here is that courts should encourage pursuing the considerate path,
even though it may not satisfy the copyright holder. On this same principle,
the court should recognize that Google's opt-out option is cordial and a sign of
good faith. Just as would-be defendants are encouraged to ask permission from
copyright holders, an actual defendant like Google should not be penalized for
offering a chance to opt out of what it believes is a fair use.'
Turning to consideration of societal benefit, Google Book Search has been
helpful to many users. User comments demonstrate the tremendous service the
database offers. 116 Researchers are able to find materials more efficiently,
everyday users are able to find new and interesting books, and the likelihood
of finding out-of-print materials is substantially improved. 17 Other benefits
are also evident: researchers can look for specific phrases in works, speech
writers can more quickly find quotes, and journal editors can locate pinpoint
cites more easily. The libraries benefit as well: Google is providing each of the
five participating libraries complete digital copies of the works that library
112. See discussion supra note 80; see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585 n. 18.
113. Posting of Susan Wojcicki, Vice President, Product Management to Official Google Blog
(Sept. 20, 2005), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2005/09/google-print-and-authors-guild.html.
114. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986).
115. The suggestion here is not to increase the weight assigned to a defendant's beliefs. The
critical element of advocacy here is that Google should not be penalized for its belief. Defendants
who have even the best intentions, if they are willfully blind to the reality of their infringing use,
should still be ineligible for a victory under this aspect of the fair use analysis. And even those
who have genuine good faith should not have carte blanche access to the fair use defense: a
mistaken good-faith belief does not render an objectively unfair use fair. However, the good faith
of a defendant is a reasonable, precedent-based portion of the Factor 1 analysis. In this limited
capacity, Google's good faith favors a finding of fair use.
116. Google Book Search User Stories, http://books.google.com/googleprint/testimonials.
html (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
117. Id.
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submits." 8 Some authors and publishers are also pleased with Google's use
and have seen various benefits." 9 There are clearly substantial societal gains
flowing from Google's use, which tilt Factor 1 further towards favoring fair
use.
A societal benefiting use, however, is not a free ticket to use works with-
out paying. This raises the question: if Google is required to pay for the works'
use, will the societal benefits offered by the Book Search Project survive? The
public domain works at the libraries would presumably still be scanned either
way, but they account for only a small percentage of the libraries' total collec-
tion. Thus, the greatest strength of Google's use-its comprehensive scope-
would be severely diminished. Could the project still succeed if Google had to
acquire licenses for the copyright-protected books? Given the immense com-
plexities in licensing alone, the answer may be no.' 20 Google estimates it will
take seven years to digitize books that are already neatly catalogued on shelves
at the five major libraries; how much longer would it take to accomplish this
with the additional tasks of locating, negotiating for and securing rights to
millions of books, and then coordinating piecemeal scanning from the librar-
ies? It is also unclear whether Google would still provide the digital copies to
libraries that it is providing under the Library Project. This fringe benefit of
Google's use, though certainly not controlling, may be illustrative of the costs
of a ruling against Google. Given that fair use is specifically intended to pro-
mote things such as research and scholarship, it seems reasonable it would
protect Google's project. In taking note of the societal benefit this project of-
fers, courts would be wise to recognize its implausibility if Google's use is
ruled "unfair."
But what about libraries? If Google and other similarly-situated compa-
nies cannot create such a database if required to obtain authorization, could
libraries somehow do it, thereby preserving the societal benefit? A massive
digitization project requires a substantial staff to scan works, catalog them,
upload them, track status, and carry out a host of other clerical, administrative
and technical duties. Even the best-funded libraries might balk at undertaking
a task similar to the scope of Google's Project. James Hilton, interim univer-
sity librarian at the University of Michigan, had his staff research how long it
would take their library to digitize their collection of over seven million vol-
118. Google Book Search, Information for Publishers and Authors about the Library Project,
supra note 49.
119. See discussion infra note 168.
120. At least two commentators have concluded the cost would be prohibitive. See Jonathan
Kerry-Tyerman, Note, No Analog Analogue: Searchable Digital Archives and Amazon's
Unprecedented Search Inside the Book Program as Fair Use, 2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 81
(2006) (analyzing the possibility of securing rights for Amazon's Search Inside the Book program,
as well as other issues that parallel Google's claims); Travis, supra note 64, at 805-10 (concluding
that digital libraries would "literally have to hire a private detective'.., and track down the
inheritors under thousands of wills, trusts, and succession battles" among several other potentially
insurmountable hurdles).
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umes. 12 1 The answer?--over 1,000 years. 122 It is estimated that Google may
spend between $200 million 123 and $500 million to scan the fifteen million
volumes earmarked for the project. 124 Even the largest and best-funded librar-
ies balk at such figures.' 25 Creating such a digital library involves several other
hurdles: the works must be scanned and stored somewhere (both physically
and then digitally), delicate books demand exquisite handling during scanning,
and works must be collected to be scanned. Google leased a 40,000-square-
foot warehouse in Ann Arbor, Mich., developed new scanners to handle
delicate books, and invested an unknown number of staff in the Book Search
Project. 126 Libraries faced with these burdens have retreated, unable to
shoulder the weight; even the Library of Congress-"the largest repository of
human knowledge in history"127 -is counting on the private sector for
digitization projects. 12 Perhaps Google is the only vessel sturdy enough to
contain such a project. Finally, even if libraries (or others) could overcome
these hurdles, they would also be subject to a copyright infringement suit.
129
Consequently, a likely end result of a ruling against Google would be that
nothing near the scope of Google's attempt could be realized now or in the
near future.
In summary, the focus of Factor 1 is likely to be the transformative analy-
sis. Google is using the works in a commercial manner, which favors a finding
of unfair use. However, because Google is using the works in a way that is
distinct from their original purpose, its use is transformative; such a finding
121. Katie Hafner, At Harvard, a Man, a Plan and a Scanner: Google's Quest to Digitize
Books Prompts Soul Searching, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at Cl [hereinafter Hafner, At
Harvard].
122. Id.
123. Id. Google has not disclosed how much it is spending on the project but analysts have
speculated this figure.
124. This number is derived by using the estimate that a $5 million donation is enough to
scan approximately 150,000 books, dividing it by 150,000 (to estimate the cost per book-33.33)
and multiplying it by 15 million. Hafner, Microsoft to Offer, supra note 60, at C6. Certainly this is
a very rough estimate as it does not take into account the special scanning equipment Google is
using (which may reduce cost) or that books cost less as more are scanned. Id. at C5. (stating $5
million is enough to scan about 150,000 books); Google Book Search: News & Views, supra note
38 (stating the libraries partnering with Google as of 2005 contain over 15 million books).
125. Hafner, At Harvard, supra note 121, at Cl. Sidney Verba, former chairman of the
Harvard University Press, stated that digitizing the library "would be beyond anything we could
imagine funding." Id.
126. Id. (reporting the lease of the warehouse and creation of new, secret scanners).
127. Kerry-Tyerman, supra note 120, 70 (citing LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, STRATEGIC PLAN:
INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND AND FUTURE DIRECTION FOR THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (2004),
http://www.loc.gov/about/history/pdfs/04-08StrategicPlan8-14.pdf).
128. Katie Hafner, Google Gift to Digital Library, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2005, at C6 ("Long
on ambition, but short on the necessary funds, the Library of Congress has increasingly turned to
the private sector for underwriting its digitization projects."). This article also reports Google's
three million dollar gift to the Library's efforts with "no strings attached." Id.
129. 17 U.S.C. § 108(c)(2) (2000); see also 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.03[E][l])[c], at 8-44 n.63.17 ("Congress intended to permit [various
copies but not in] a computerized form." (quoting S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 61 (1998)). See
discussion infra note 180 on the library exception.
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will lessen the importance of the commercial nature of the use. Because
Google also appears to have acted in good faith and in a manner that benefits
society greatly, this factor should favor a finding of fair use.
130
D. Factor 2: The Nature of the Copyright-Protected Work
1. Background to Factor 2
Factor 2 examines whether the works being infringed are works of fiction
(creative works) or works of fact. Creative works are supposedly afforded
more protection than factual works.' 3 ' This is not surprising as copyright pro-
tects expression, not factual content. Courts rarely discuss this factor in detail
and it is generally not given much weight.' 32 In fact, in cases of both nonfic-
tion (where this factor would favor fair use) and cases of fiction (where this
factor would favor unfair use), courts have readily reached the opposite fair or
unfair use determination. 133 But ultimately, the idea is that while protected,
factual works are more susceptible to a finding of fair use, and the user is thus
more likely to win the second factor.
2. Application to Google
Under a traditional analysis this factor likely cancels itself out. Because
both creative and factual works will be part of the Google Library, this factor,
on an aggregate scale, offers little assistance to the fair use analysis. And con-
sidering this in light of the minimal weight the statistics show Factor 2 tradi-
tionally carries, Factor 2 will not likely be a matter for heavy debate. This sec-
tion, however, briefly considers two possible deviations from the traditional
analysis, given the type-blind nature of Google's use.
First, courts have not clearly indicated whether the increase in protection a
creative work is offered is proportional to the decrease in protection a factual
work is offered. Even if Google's use of each type could be quantified, which
is improbable given the number of works involved, it is still unclear what a
court would do with such statistics: does a 50% creative works to 50% factual
works ratio equate to this factor's coming out neutral? Perhaps the additional
protection offered to creative works is sufficiently potent that even a 25%
creative to 75% factual ratio still favors unfair use. Based on the minimal
130. Other commentators have come to a slightly different conclusion than I have. See, e.g.,
Emily Anne Proskine, Google's Technicolor Dreamcoat: A Copyright Analysis of the Google
Book Search Library Project, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213, 226-27 (2006) (concluding the use is
not commercial). Ms. Proskine comes to different conclusions on other points as well, though she
suggests the possibility of a digital library indexing immunity, potentially a viable remedy to
address the host of modern caching and indexing problems facing courts. Id. at 233-34. Ms.
Proskine's article also makes the interesting suggestion of preemptively addressing security
concerns by creating an "insurance fund" to be used for compensating authors in the event of a
leak or successful hacking of Google's full-text copies. Id. at 234-35.
131. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
132. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.05[A][2][a].
133. Id. § 13.05[A][2][a], at 13-182.1 n.136.2.
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attention courts have given this factor previously and the corresponding
reduced influence the factor commands,' 3 it is unlikely, under a traditional
analysis, that this factor will favor either unfair or fair use.
Second, what if the factual versus fictional distinction is more than just a
"what kind of work is it" analysis? What if it also concerns how the content of
the work is used? Unlike a Factor 1 analysis that considers whether the fic-
tional or factual work is used in a new way, here the inquiry would instead be
on whether the new use is still one where copyright is interested in drawing a
factual-fictional distinction. Specifically, if the new use were one where there
was no utility in drawing a distinction, would Factor 2 favor a finding of fair
use? A sort of "nontraditional-ambivalent" analysis would thus be employed.
Again, the Google Caf6 analogy is instructive in this nontraditional analy-
sis. As before, Google has built all of its booths, chairs and tables out of full-
color photocopies of books. Under a fair use analysis, would chairs made of
factual works be more likely to be found a fair use while tables made of fic-
tional works were more prone to a finding of unfair use? It seems odd to dis-
tinguish the Catcher in the Rye chair from the World Almanac table on the
nature of the works comprising each. Instead, Factor 2 would note that this use
poses no greater danger to copyright's spirit and, just as factual works are far-
ther from the core of copyright's protections and favor fair use, here the chairs
and tables escape the nexus requiring additional protections. Factor 2 would
then favor fair use. Under this analysis, Factor 2 is most true to the purpose of
distinguishing factual works from fictional works: protecting expression. In
other words, this test would ask whether the use of the works was one copy-
right was "ambivalent" about or not, and if it was, Factor 2 would favor a
finding of fair use. However, this would be a new approach, and it is likely
that the analysis in Google's lawsuits will rely on the traditional fact-fiction
distinction and Factor 2 will come out neutral. Even if it does not come out
neutral, as the statistics above reveal, Factor 2 carries hardly any weight in the
fair use analysis. Thus, this factor likely is neutral, and carries too little weight
to affect the decision much even if not neutral.
E. Factor 3: The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
1. Background to Factor 3
Factor 3 considers "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole." 135 This factor rewards defendants
for using only as much of a copyright-protected work as is necessary and con-
siders both the qualitative and quantitative value of the copied portion.' 36 For
example, taking only a small amount can still be too much if the portions taken
134. See supra Part II.A for statistical data and discussion illustrating this.
135. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
136. See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.05, at 13-157 to -158 & n.18, §
13.05[A][3], at 13-191 to -192.
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constitute the "heart" of the work. 137 The amount used may also assist in deter-
mining other factors such as one and four: if an entire work was copied, it may
reveal "a dearth of transformative character [pertaining to Factor 1] . . .or a
greater likelihood of harm under the fourth [factor]."' 38 Again, there are no
bright-line rules and copying entire works, when necessary for an otherwise
fair use, is permitted. 39 This factor appears to command some weight in the
results when considered statistically. However, given its mutable nature, courts
are likely to give it little weight in the fair use analysis. 40
Courts have sometimes treated this factor as either favoring the plaintiff or
favoring no one. In considering "the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole," courts have effectively
made this a pass-fail test for the defendant: if she used too much, she fails this
test and Factor 3 favors the plaintiff. But if she uses an acceptable amount,
instead of it favoring the defendant, it favors no one.' 4' The Supreme Court,
however, has recognized that using only the appropriate amount causes this
factor to favor the defendant. 42 This recognition is important to the analysis-
if the fair use test is to remain a balancing of interests, a defendant's appropri-
ate conduct should do something more than merely set the scales to even. 43
2. Application to Google
Google's use of entire works is "presumptively unfair"144 but, because it is
necessary to its product, this should not weigh against fair use. 145 Google can-
not provide a search engine that is useful for finding actual words in the text
by using anything other than the full text. If Google were to pick and choose
what search terms would return a book, it would substantially decrease the
137. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
138. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587 (1994).
139. See generally Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Nufiez v.
Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2000).
140. Ironically, this factor's question of whether the use took too much often cannot be
answered until the use is determined fair or unfair. After all, if a use is unfair, no matter how little
it took, it was too much. Similarly, if it is fair, the use may take the entire work if necessary
(which courts usually conclude is the case). Thus, to know how much is too much, the court first
has to decide if the use is fair or not. So while the statistics in Part lI.A indicate it receives a great
deal of weight, it is more accurate to conclude it is controlled by what the other three factors
dictate.
141. See generally Kelly, 336 F.3d 811 (holding that complete copying of photos, though
appropriate to the use in a photo search engine, resulted in Factor 3 favoring neither party).
142. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 599.
143. Alternatively, Factor 3 could be modified to be an unweighed factor that functions as a
blue pencil trigger. As in contract law, if a use is found to take too much, courts could, if
appropriate, specify the amount that would be permissible. The aggregate fair use analysis would
not be affected by this factor. Instead, otherwise fair uses that took too much from the copyright-
protected work would be permitted under the remaining three-pronged analysis and under this
factor would be blue penciled. See Part IV for additional discussion of this idea and other
modifications to the analysis.
144. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594.
145. See id.
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utility of its database; card catalogs already do this. A substantial part of the
utility of Google's project is that it vastly exceeds the scope of a card catalog
or even an index of reviewers: it empowers users to find any word, in any text,
anywhere in the world's books. Google must copy entire works to achieve this
and thus this factor should favor fair use.
Google has, however, taken "the heart of the works"1 46 by copying them
in their entirety: in fact, Google has taken the heart, body, and every other
essential organ within the works by comprehensively copying them. But the
important distinction under this factor is that Google has not taken the soul.
The Harper & Row Court crafted the "heart" language to mean more than just
a section of the work, some quantitative number of pages. The Court meant
"heart" in the more symbolic sense of "the important essence of the piece."
' 147
This distinction is critical because while Google took everything inside the
works, it has left the "important essence," or "soul" as worded above, fully
intact. Paradoxically, it has not used the expression of the works, it has merely
made an exact copy of the words creating that expression. While every word in
Of Mice and Men is searchable on Google Book Search, a user can know
nothing but snippets of George's great struggle through even a detailed search:
she must go obtain the book to experience its soul.148 Because Google has
taken only what it needs-and has not taken the soul-this factor favors fair
use.
F. Factor 4: The Effect on the Potential Market
1. Background to Factor 4
"The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work" has occasionally been treated by the Supreme Court as the most
important factor of the four. 14 9 Not surprisingly, the statistics in Part II.A
above show it has been given the most weight in the fair use analysis. Under
this rubric, courts have given the effect on the market substantial weight and
declared it "undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use."'
150
However, in Campbell, the Court may have implicitly retreated from this
emphasis because no mention was given to its previously preeminent status in
the analysis.15 But this is a very tenuous precedential argument currently, as it
exists only by implication. In fact, Factor 4 has still recently been referred to
146. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
147. Id. at 566.
148. Unless of course the publisher chooses to allow reading a large percentage of the book,
which, because it would be permission based, would not be copyright infringement.
149. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984); Harper &
Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
150. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
151. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994).
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by some courts as the first among equals1 52 and it generally offers the most
reliable means of predicting whether an infringing use is a fair use. 153
Under Factor 4, courts consider the harm to the market caused by the
infringing use. 154 Courts agree that if the original work is superseded by the
infringing use, this factor weighs heavily against fair use. 155 Indeed, the
infringing use need not itself have harmed the market of the original, it is
enough that if the challenged use were to become widespread the market
would be damaged. 156 The market harmed also does not have to presently exist
(it may be a future, potential market)157 and the market need not be the same
market as that of the original (a derivative market will also suffice).' 58 But it is
at this point-determining what derivative markets suffice-that courts part
company. Some adopt a narrow interpretation, considering only those markets
likely to be developed under this factor.' 59 Other courts imply that any market
that the plaintiff could conceivably license is enough. 6° This "conceivably
license" test is highly problematic. It is clear that everything can conceivably
be licensed: if the use is profitable, someone will pay for it. This always-anti-
defendant approach risks substantially undermining the fair use doctrine.
6 1
In fair use cases, at least where the use is commercial, the defendant puts
the plaintiffs copyright-protected work to use in a market that the defendant
predicts will be lucrative.162 Additionally, copyright holders pursue innovative
markets often without warning and so it is unclear what markets "would in
152. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir.
1996) (en banc). But cf Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1998)
(stating that Factor 4 must be considered equally along with the other three and is no longer given
the most weight, and noting that the analysis pursued previously in Harper & Row and Sony was
"conspicuously absent from the Campbell opinion"). Also, note that the statistics included in Part
fI.A indicate that Factor I also carries great weight.
153. See statistics supra Part ILA; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.05[B] (articu-
lating the use of Factor 4's functional test).
154. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
155. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590; Nufiez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 24-25
(1st Cir. 2000); Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. Bleem, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir.
2000); Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1048-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
156. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985).
157. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
158. Id.
159. "The market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original
works would in general develop or license others to develop." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592
(emphasis added).
160. This factor would be satisfied "even if the copyrightholder [sic] had not yet entered the
new market in issue, for a copyrightholder's [sic] 'exclusive' rights ... include the right, within
broad limits, to curb the development of such a derivative market by refusing to license a
copyrighted work or by doing so only on terms the copyright owner finds acceptable." MP3.com,
92 F. Supp. at 352 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
161. Other commentators have also noted this circularity and the great danger it poses. See
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.05[Al[4] for a discussion of this problem.
162. There are exceptions to this, of course. For example, a plaintiff could sue to secure,
through settlement or a verdict, a licensing fee independent of the success of the defendant's
market.
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general develop or [be] license[d].' 63 If the mere possibility of a market con-
trols this factor, fair use may be impossible: in a capitalist system, there may
be a market for everything. And if a competitor entering a market post-lawsuit
proves or creates a potential market, entering a market becomes a business
weapon: if your competitor is being sued for an infringing use, by entering that
market yourself, the defendant loses the fourth factor.164 What then is the
proper analysis under Factor 4?
The question is not answered clearly by existing Supreme Court prece-
dent. At a minimum, it is clear that several historically fair uses could be
licensed but courts have nevertheless protected them as fair: parodies, use of
photo graphs in newspapers, and use of works in films are a few such exam-
ples.' But beyond this bedrock principle, consensus is rare. Worst of all for
Google, this puzzle is especially problematic in cases where courts wrestle
with innovative applications such as those presented by the Internet. As a
result, deference to existing markets and possible licensing schemes may be all
the more likely here. Clearly, this factor is in need of clarification.' 66 The fol-
lowing application to Google fleshes out these problems in greater detail. In
addition, Part IV discusses some possible Factor 4 modifications.
2. Application to Google
Google's situation will certainly test the courts' understanding of this fac-
tor. In a strict sense, Google is using copyright-protected works in a com-
pletely different market from the original market for the works and is in no
way superseding the use of the books. This is because unless the copyright
holders give Google permission, no Google Book Search user can read full
copies of books online. Even if Google's use were to become widespread it is
unlikely the market for the protected works would be harmed. In fact, while
not controlling,' 67 Google Book Search has thus far helped at least some
participating publishers, and widespread use may actually benefit copyright
holders, as it has for related programs like Amazon's Search Inside the
163. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
164. See Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 851 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (stating that a
post-lawsuit licensing contract was evidence of a potential market).
165. See, e.g., NtMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.05[A][4] (discussing that even these
uses could be claimed as markets a plaintiff would like to enter).
166. See discussion infra this Part and Part IV for some possible clarifications.
167. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 n.21.
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Book. 168 As the Author's Guild itself noted in an official press release on
Amazon's similar program, projects like these do not hurt much of the book
market: "Most fiction titles are not likely to be greatly threatened."'' 69 Up to
this point it is clear this factor favors fair use.
The confusing portion of the analysis comes when Google's use is exam-
ined as impacting a derivative market: licensing the books to be copied for use
in a searchable database. The analysis begins by looking for a current or
emerging market. As discussed above, it is likely that Google (or another
similarly-situated competitor like Yahoo! or Microsoft) would be willing to
pay for a license if necessary to start such a project. But such reluctant will-
ingness does not control, as fair use asks who should pay, not who would.
There is also an existing market-predominantly occupied by journals and not
books-for licensing the complete display of works, including the ability to
search those works. 170 However, the existing market fails to capture the
essence of Google's project-Google Book Search does not display full copy-
right-protected works and it would contain more works. Thus, unless reluctant
willingness or competitor attacks are counted, there appears to be no market
168. Tony Sanfilipo, Penn State Press Marketing and Sales Director, stated:
Since our titles became active on Google [Book Search], visits to our website have gone up 124
percent. The converted POD titles averaged 19 sales per month before [Google Book Search]-and
74 copies in the first month after we joined .... We're quite happy with the results .... With
Google Book Search, we make more content available-forever-and we sell more books.
Google Book Search Partner Program, Google Book Search Case Study, https://books.google.com
/partner/pennstate (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
At least some authors also are grateful:
As an author whose books appear in Google [Book Search], I want to express my support for the
project. I appreciate potential readers being able to find my book, examine an excerpt-as they
might do while leafing through the book at a store, or as they might do on a major seller like
Amazon-and deciding for themselves if the book is for them.... Google is not in any way allevi-
ating the need for books to exist or be purchased, and in fact are making these books more notice-
able and accessible than ever before. [-Don, Author, Las Vegas, NV]
Google Book Search, User Stories, supra note 116.
It is also likely that authors generally will benefit. The ability to search and view the actual
text of books at Amazon.com increased sales of searchable books by 10% over "the mute, print-
only versions." Travis, supra note 64, at 822 (citing Monica Soto Ouchi, New Amazon Feature
Aids Sales, SEATrLE TIMES, Oct. 31, 2003, at E3).
169. The Authors Guild, Amazon's New Database Likely to Help Sales of Some Works,
May Undermine Others, Text of Guild's E-Mail to Members (Oct. 24, 2003), available at
http://www.authorsguild.org/news/10_24-03.htm. The press release e-mail also notes: "This
program will likely prove to be useful in promoting certain titles. Midlist and backlist books that
are receiving little attention, for example, may benefit from additional exposure in searches." Id.
The books the press release is most concerned about-recipe books for example, because being
able to see even a full page gives away value-are not at risk in Google's program, because
Google only displays three sentences, not nearly enough to make most recipes.
170. Westlaw, Lexis, and HeinOnline immediately spring to mind as examples. It is unclear
whether the right to search is implied or explicitly stated in whatever licensing agreement the
online databases have with publishers.
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presently for licensing only the use of the work in a searchable database.' 7'
The factor turns on how to determine whether the market that obviously could
exist affects the fair use analysis.
Different courts have used various standards to determine what derivative
and potential markets enter the fair use analysis. Precedent supports that some
uses do not require a license despite being a derivative market,'1 2 but the guid-
ance provided in identifying those markets is weak. The court may rely on the
language "traditional, reasonable and likely to be developed [markets will
favor unfair use].' 73 Applying this language, Google's use is not "traditional"
because it is one of the first in the market. But it is tempting to call it a "rea-
sonable" or "likely" use. The court could look at the progression of the Web
and gradual move to put copyright-protected works online and conclude that it
was natural for publishers to put works online. This temptation should be
resisted as this observation, while accurate, is not answering the right question.
The questions posed by Factor 4 is whether the market for using complete
copyright-protected works, as searchable documents in a centralized database
containing the works of all publishers, is likely to be developed by any given
publisher or by publishers as a group.
This is not likely a market that publishers would traditionally, reasonably,
or likely enter. Publishers have never attempted anything like this before-
even though publishers were on notice of this potential market as early as
1993174 and even after Amazon.corn allowed Search Inside the Book via
A9.com. On the other hand, one commentator has noted that there is still a
market for licensing the books' display beyond the snippets provided by the
database via the Google Book Search Publisher's Program. 175 Even still,
Factor 4 would favor a finding of fair use because the market is not a tradi-
tional or likely market. Unfortunately, given the conflicting precedent, the
courts may or may not reach this conclusion.
In concluding the Factor 4 analysis, it bears revisiting that a "reluctant
willingness" to license by potential Google competitors should not control this
171. Unless Yahoo! or Microsoft have in fact begun to purchase licenses from publishers, in
which case the question discussed earlier becomes relevant: is the fact that someone is willing to
pay for a license dispositive in this factor? The answer should be no or fair use is severely
undermined.
172. Parodies and news reporting are two such examples. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
173. Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, 126 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929 n. 17, 931 (2d Cir. 1994)). Google's lawsuits
are also in the Second Circuit.
174. "Back in 1993, President Clinton announced a bill to fund what was then so quaintly
called the information superhighway. He talked about how it would let a classroom in Kansas
access anything in the Library of Congress. Did publishers think that was just an abstract idea?"
Kevin Maney, Critics Should Grasp Google Projects Before Blasting Them, USA TODAY, Nov. 9,
2005, at 3B.
175. "The existence of the [Book Search] Publisher Program, which involves licensing,
demonstrates that the Library Project does not preclude lucrative licensing arrangements. By
participating in the [Book Search] Publisher Program, publishers receive revenue streams not
available to them under the Library Project." Jonathan Band, Copyright Owners v. The Google
Print Library Project, 17 ENT. L.R. 2006, 21, 23 (2006).
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factor. So too, the definition of "potential market" must have some boundaries.
If the "potential market" definition becomes "any conceivable market" or
"those markets the defendant or competitors would reluctantly pay for," this
factor has become stacked against fair use. A better approach is something
akin to the "traditional, reasonable or likely to be developed" approach taken
in Ringgold and discussed above. 176 Such an approach gives appropriate
substantive content to Factor 4 and simultaneously protects the spirit of copy-
right law and the fair use defense. Here, the book-database market cannot have
been a traditional, reasonable or likely-to-be-developed market because it has
been available to publishers for years, and they have taken no steps to enter it.
Google's entrance may have sparked the publisher's desire to enter the market,
but the failure to enter a potential market when the opportunity existed should
have weight in the consideration of how "likely to be developed" it really was.
Thus, this factor appears to favor Google.
G. Summary
Google's use appears to be a fair use. Factors 1 and 3 favor Google Book
Search because it employs a highly transformative use that benefits society,
because it was pursued in good faith through fair dealings, and because it uses
only as much of the copyright-protected works as is required by the project.
Factor 2 cancels itself out unless unequal weight is given to each type of work,
and even then Factor 2 may come out as neutral. Under a nontraditional-
ambivalent use analysis, however, Factor 2 would favor Google. Factor 4
should favor Google but results are unpredictable. Given the confusion over
Factor 4, the court should craft new tools in determining what derivative mar-
kets receive protection. Under the "traditional, reasonable or likely to be
developed' ' 177 analysis, Factor 4 favors Google. The statistics show that Fac-
tors 1 and 4 are the two most important, and Google has won at least Factor 1,
with a real possibility of succeeding under Factor 4 as well. But given that no
uses in the frequency analysis from Part II.A were deemed fair based solely on
178Factor 1, or even on Factors 1 and 3, and 22 uses were held fair based on
factors 1, 3 and 4, Google likely will need to prevail on Factor 4 to be held a
fair use. Finally, in terms of copyright's spirit, Google's use is one that copy-
right law should encourage, one that is even listed in the Preamble to the
Copyright Act, 179 and thus a finding of "fair use" is appropriate.
176. Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 81.
177. Id.
178. See Table 2 supra Part HA. Note also that only one use was held fair by winning even
factors 1, 2 and 3, and Google's chances of success on Factor 2 are not high.
179. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (listing "scholarship" and "research").
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Il. THE PRECEDENT: EIGHT SIMILAR CASES
Google Book Search's existence likely turns on whether it is a fair use or
not. 0 Google's fair use status may be controlled by a handful of prior deci-
sions or cases. These cases range from those raising a similar point of law but
nonbinding (for example, technology cases from other circuits) to binding
cases with little to contribute (for example, Supreme Court technology cases
that turn on other issues). This Part considers eight such cases, briefly dis-
cusses each, and applies them to Google Book Search in light of the discussion
of the four factors above. The part concludes by considering what impact a
ruling against Google's use might have on the Web, thereby setting the stage
for Part IV's contemplation of the future.
A. MP3.com, Napster, and Grokster
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 81 a case from the same district that
Google is being sued in, appears to apply directly via its dicta. The court in
MP3.com stated:
180. It is possible that other defenses will be raised, including the library exception under §
108 and a de minimis defense.
The Library Exception of § 108 is not a plausible defense because it does not apply to such
partnerships. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.05[E][2]. The library exception was
created to allow libraries to make photocopies, both for internal use and for patrons. Id., see also
17 U.S.C. § 108(a)(l)-(a)(3) (2000). Section 108(a)(1) specifically provides that the library
exception only applies to those reproductions made "without any purpose of direct or indirect
commercial advantage." 17 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1). Here, the purpose of the copy is of both direct
commercial benefit-the library receives a complete copy back from Google, saving the library
the cost of making its own digital copy-and indirect-the library provides the works to Google
for a commercial purpose. More importantly, the library is not who is making the copy: Google is
using its own personnel to scan each work in. See UM Library/Google Digitization Partnership
FAQ, August 2005, http://www.lib.umich.edu/staff/google/public/faq.pdf (last visited Oct. 9,
2006). And if these restrictions were not damning enough, the library exception does not permit
digital reproductions that are made available to the public outside the premises of the library. See
17 U.S.C. § 108(c)(2); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 132, § 8.03[E][1][c], at 8-45
n.63.26. For these reasons and others, Google does not qualify for the library exception of 17
U.S.C. § 108. And as discussed, for these same reasons, no library could create its own database if
Google is unable to.
A claim of de minimis also does not apply to Google's use. Google is making complete
copies of works and the best it could claim is that, as complete copying does not discount fair use,
it also does not discount de minimis. In Knickerbocker Toy Co. Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Interna-
tional, Inc., the defendant used a complete copyright-protected work in a commercial purpose. 668
F.2d 699, 701 (2d Cir. 1982). But, because the use was strictly for internal purposes, it was held to
not infringe. Id. at 702-03. The same could be held here: Google is using the complete scans
internally to provide a product. However, the problems inherent in this defense are evident at a
glance. One is that the defense is presumably called de minimis for a reason and Google's
complete copying is not minimal in this sense. A second concern is that Google is not using it
purely internally but as part of a service provided to its customers. A third analogizes to fair use:
other internal uses have been deemed as unfair, such as the internal use of photocopies of
scientific journals for research, so too is de minimis likely inapplicable. Finally, it would be
problematic to give companies immunity to copyright for all their internal uses. Thus, a finding of
de minimis in Google's case is very unlikely.
181. 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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Any allegedly positive impact of defendant's activities on plaintiffs
prior market in no way frees defendant to usurp a further market that directly
derives from reproduction of the plaintiffs' copyrighted works. This would be
so even if the copyrightholder [sic] had not yet entered the new market in
issue, for a copyrightholder's [sic] exclusive rights . . . include the right,
within broad limits, to curb the development of such a derivative market by
refusing to license a copyrighted work or by doing so only on terms the copy-
right owner finds acceptable... [P]laintiffs have indicated no objection in
principle to licensing [their copyrighted products]...; they simply want to
make sure they get the remuneration the law reserves for them as holders of
copyrights on creative works.1
82
The same language could be applied, almost verbatim, to Google's use
and pertains directly to the fourth factor always-anti-defendant problem dis-
cussed above. If the Google court adopts the reasoning of MP3.com, Factor 4
would favor the plaintiffs. Because Factor 4 carries great weight, perhaps this
could turn the tide against Google's use being deemed fair. 83 However,
Google is distinguishable from MP3.com as MP3.com was providing users
with access to full copies of CDs, a crucial difference. 84 MP3.com's argument
that making the copy available online was transformative was also dubious
and rejected by the court. 185 It is also of note that MP3.com's service did not
appear to advance any of the enumerated fair uses of § 107 while Google's
advances scholarship and research. Finally, MP3.com's use offered minimal
societal benefit, and the potential market of making full versions of songs
available online was closer to a "traditional market" than Google's searchable,
centralized database is. While the two cases are facially similar, the critical
distinctions are at least that Google is not making available complete copies of
the works, Google's use is transformative and the searchable book database is
not a traditional market.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 186 and A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 18 7 though recent technology-focused cases, are
distinguishable from Google in several important regards. Both cases involved
distribution of complete copyright-protected works via peer-to-peer networks,
had substantial questions of bad faith and offered a less obvious public benefit
than Google's use.' 88 Both also had, though disputed by defendants, a more
obvious effect on the market for the original works in question.,8 9 Because so
182. Id. at 352 (emphasis added, internal quotations and citations omitted); See also supra
Part II.F.1-.2 and the accompanying tables.
183. See supra Part II.A and accompanying tables; see also summary discussion supra
Part H.G.
184. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
185. Id. at 351.
186. 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005).
187. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
188. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004; Grokster, 125 S.Ct. 2764. Despite the similarity of the two
facially, they are themselves quite distinct as the architecture of the peer-to-peer (commonly
abbreviated as "p2p") network in Napster was very distinct from that of Grokster. See Grokster,
125 S.Ct. at 2770; Napster, 239 F.3d 1011-12.
189. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2777; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016-17.
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many critical differences exist, the two cases offer little assistance to the
Google lawsuits.
B. Kirkwood and Roxbury Data Interface
Returning to the transformative inquiry, Infinity Broadcast Corporation v.
Kirkwood'90 has been cited recently as predictive that Google's use will be
found an unfair use. 19' In Kirkwood, the retransmission of radio broadcasts to
advertisers was held an unfair use because, in part, the defendant "merely
repackage[d] . . . the original" and there was no "new expression, new mean-
ing nor new message."' 92 As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals went on to
note, Kirkwood was simply rebroadcasting unaltered transmissions and the use
of those transmissions by the subscribers to Kirkwood's service were not at
issue. 19 3 In other words, Kirkwood's failure to add "new expression" meant his
use was not transformative. Google's use, however, is distinct from the use in
Kirkwood. Google does not merely retransmit originals, it instead reduces
originals to searchable code that it provides in a database format. Google's
users, unlike Kirkwood's subscribers, have no access to complete copyright-
protected works because Google's use turns the books into a data mine. Not
only does Google expressly abstain from simply "repackag[ling] or repub-
lish[ing] the original work, the defect of Kirkwood's use, it offers no com-
prehensive and direct access to the copyright-protected originals. In short,
Google takes the originals and transforms them into a new product with new
purpose and meaning. Thus, Kirkwood should not control the result for
Google.
Despite the very modem questions posed by the technological aspects of
Google's use, New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc. from 1977
is somewhat on point.'9 5 In Roxbury, a district court in New Jersey considered
whether an index of names from the New York Times was a fair use.' 9 6 The
index in question, created by defendant Roxbury Data Interface, was actually
an index of another index: plaintiff New York Times Company's index of the
New York Times newspaper.1 97 The defendants had read through the plain-
tiffs index and copied down page numbers and names, then sorted those
names alphabetically, allowing a user to locate stories in the plaintiff's index
based on the people connected to the story. 198 The court assumed the plaintiffs
190. 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998).
191. See Hanratty, supra note 62, U 18-21.
192. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d at 108 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 434 F. Supp. 217 (D.N.J. 1977).
196. Id.
197. Interestingly, it was not just an in-print index: there was also an online version of the
index. However, it was the plaintiffs-the copyright holders-who operated it, so it was not the
subject of the fair use analysis, nor was it even infringed. Id. at 224.
198. Id. at 219-20.
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copyright protection extended to the names in their index and analyzed the
defendant's use under the fair use doctrine.'
99
The court concluded it was a fair use because all four factors favored the
defendants.2 °° While the court's conclusions that the name index advanced
public interest and aided researchers certainly apply to Google, its analysis
under Factor 4 is the most directly relevant to the Google Book Search Project.
The court concluded:
[D]efendant's index is not another version of plaintiff's index, but a work
with a different function and form.... [N]o creative idea of plaintiffs' has
been appropriated by defendants. [N]o list comparable to defendants' index
can be found in the [plaintiffs] Times Index.20 1
The court's conclusion that the fourth factor favored the defendants was also
informed by evidence that the plaintiffs had considered publishing a names
index but decided the market was too small. This distinguishes Roxbury
from Google' s case, as there is presumably the possibility of a large market for
licensing books to be included in Google's database. Still, the Roxbury court's
fourth factor analysis recognized the "different function and form" of the
names index; it recognized that, though the names index involved copying of
the plaintiff's works, "no creative idea ... ha[d] been appropriated . . 3
Although Google's copying does take the creative elements from the copied
works, the difference is a technicality deriving from the advantages of digital
technology, because the creative elements copied by Google are never made
available to Google users (except in isolated snippets). Like in Roxbury,
Google's copying was a technical violation of copyright law, but not a viola-
tion of its spirit.
C. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.2°4 is almost completely on point for a fair-use
205analysis of Google's Book Search Project use. In Kelly, the defendant was
using plaintiffs copyright-protected photos in his search engine. The images
were reduced to thumbnail size and only the thumbnails were displayed when
search results were returned. While at one point the full images were dis-
played, that issue was separately discussed from the thumbnail search engine
199. Id. at 221.
200. Under Factor 1, the commercial nature of the use was trumped by the "public interest in
the dissemination of information" and the fact that the names index would "save researchers a
considerable amount of time." Id. Under Factors 2 and 3, the defendant was held to have taken
from a primarily factual work and only as much as was necessary for the use. Id. at 221-23.
Finally, under Factor 4, the court concluded there was only minimal market injury based on no
compelling evidence that the plaintiffs were going to publish a names index. Id. at 225.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. This concept is similar to the "innovativeness" analysis suggested infra Part IV.
204. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
205. Id. at 821-22.
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issue. The defendant claimed his use was fair because the pictures were not
replacing the original market but were instead a new use and thus transforma-
tive. The court found fair use because the-use was transformative, its impact
on the market was minimal or nonexistent, and it did not take place in a pro-
tected derivative market.
206
If the court does not distinguish or decline to follow Kelly, Google's use
will be a fair use. Google is doing just what Kelly allows: Arriba allowed
searching for images and displayed a thumbnail version of the image (that is, a
lower resolution, smaller version) after the search, and Google allows search-
ing for phrases in books and displays a sort of thumbnail version (for example,
snippets of text from the book) that does not come close to reproducing the
original. The only difference between Google's use and that in Kelly is that
Google keeps a permanent copy of the copyright-protected work while Arriba
Soft made a full copy and then deleted it. 2 7 But this is a minimal difference,
because Arriba Soft still copied the protected pictures. Additionally, this dif-
ference is best addressed by Factor 3 of the analysis: Arriba Soft could not
keep a copy because no full copy was needed whereas Google may keep a
copy because its search engine could not function without it. Using Factor 3 to
address this concern is both proper and gives this factor a more substantive
function in the fair use analysis. 2 8 Google is doing essentially the same thing
that Arriba Soft was doing by putting copyright-protected works into a search-
able database and, as a result, Kelly suggests that Google's use is fair.
D. Recent Google Cases and the Web
Two recent cases also provide guidance in Google's lawsuit: Field v.
Google, Inc.20 9 and Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc.210 Both cases involved caching
of Web content: Field involved caching copyright-protected Web pages, 21' and
Perfect 10 involved caching thumbnails from an adult Web site in the Google
Image Search.2 12 Again, the first and fourth factor analyses are the most inter-
esting.
The court in Field concluded Google's caching was a fair use for several
reasons. Under Factor 1, the court noted that Google's cache serves a different
purpose than the original Web pages by enhancing information-gathering
techniques on the Internet. 213 Under the fourth factor, the court, citing the
206. Id.
207. Id. at 816.
208. As the statistics in Part II.A illustrate, the potency of Factor 3 is currently limited in
comparison to Factors 1 and 4. This might help reduce the disparity.
209. 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
210. 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
211. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1110-14.
212. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d a 831-35. Perfect 10 also involved the Image Search more
generally, but it is the thumbnails portion that is most instructive here because Google Book
Search is not participating in the displaying of whole copyright-protected works as Google was in
Perfect 10. Id.
213. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 118.
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Supreme Court in Sony, noted that "a use that has no demonstrable effect upon
the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work need not be prohib-
ited in order to protect the author's incentive to create."214 This is an impor-
tant implication: the author's incentive was not harmed by the use in Field.
The court then went on to consider plaintiff Field's derivative market argu-
ment:
Field contends that Google's caching functionality harmed the market for his
works by depriving him of revenue he could have obtained by licensing
Google the right to present "cached" links for the pages containing his works.
Under this view, the market for a copyrighted work is always harmed by the
fair use of the work .... The Supreme Court has explained that the fourth fair
use factor is not concerned with such syllogisms. Instead, it only considers
the impact on markets "that the creators of original works would in general
develop or license others to develop." [citation omitted]
215
Just as an author's incentive to create is not reasonably related to licensing
revenue from caching, neither is it related to licensing revenue from Google's
Book Search database. As discussed above, allowing a plaintiff to develop an
interest in licensing the market after the defendant's use is already under way
reduces fair use to a theoretical but rarely available defense. Thus, if the court
adopts the analysis from Field, Factor 4 would favor Google.
On the other side of Field stands Perfect 10, where caching thumbnails
was held an unfair use, in partial conflict with Kelly. Under Factor 1, the
Perfect 10 court concluded the use was not purely transformative:
[T]he thumbnails here closely approximate a key function of [Perfect 10's]
full-size originals, at least to the extent that viewers of [Perfect 10's] photos
of nude women pay little attention to fine details.
But that does not end the analysis, because Google's use is simultane-
ously consumptive as well. In early 2005, after itfiled suit against Google,
[Perfect 10] entered into a licensing agreement. .. for the sale and distribu-
tion of [Perfect 10] reduced-size images for download to and use on cell
phones.
216
Noting the "truism" that search engines like Google Image Search "provide
great value to the public," 217 the court still concluded that Factor 1 favored
Perfect 10. This conclusion, based on the "consumptive" analysis, foreclosed
analysis under Factor 4, where the cell phone market caused the factor to favor
unfair use.
2 18
Applying Perfect 10 to Google's case, the Book Search project might not
be a fair use because just as Perfect 10's entering into a licensing agreement
214. Id. (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 450) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
215. Id. at 1121 n.9.
216. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 847, 849.
217. Id. at 848.
218. Id. at 851.
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for cell phone downloads created a traditional or reasonable market, so too
could the plaintiffs defeat the Book Search by entering into an agreement with
Yahoo! or Microsoft. Or perhaps the licensing scheme Google already offers
to publishers would alone show the existence of a market. This approach, in
the same breath, would control Factors 1 and 4, thereby determining the fair
use analysis as a whole. Perfect 10 may thus foreshadow the end of all truly
comprehensive image search engines.2
19
What about the indexing of copyright-protected content on the Web? As
Google has noted, 2 ° search engines make complete copies of copyright-
protected Web sites in their indexing processes. If this is a fair use-and it is
unclear how the Web would function if it were deemed unfair-is Google's
Library Project use also necessarily fair? Courts are somewhat divided: cach-
ing Web pages was recently held a fair use, 22' while caching thumbnail images
was not.222 Part of the problem in comparing indexing the Web to indexing
books is that the operation of the Web is almost indistinguishable from search
engines. Except for a few other mechanisms, 22 3 the public relies entirely on
search engines to traverse it. Because of the great social utility of allowing this
practice, it is hard to conclude that such a use is unfair. Google Book Search
only stands to become this socially useful; it is easy to conclude that copying
books is not allowed under fair use but copying Web pages is permissible
because it is too late to change. Should the court choose to restrict or disallow
Google Book Search, it will need to be careful not to be so broad in its ruling
that it has "profound negative effects on future innovators of technology" or
otherwise cripples the Web.2
IV. THE FUTURE: A NEW FAIR USE
A. Life After Gozer
Whether Google's use is deemed fair or foul, copyright will live to protect
another day. While Google's use should be deemed fair, it is also important
that the courts handling the case patch the areas of the fair use doctrine that the
Google Projects reveal as wanting. In particular, given the true uniqueness of
219. Just as users could download adult pictures, so too could they download any other
copyright-protected picture. Unless search engines could negotiate licenses for the billions of
images under copyright, they could not operate except to display images out of copyright. This
would be unfortunate, as shutting down image searches does not prevent infringement: users can
always find the full-size, copyright-protected images with a Web-text search and use a simple
program to scale the images down to thumbnail size.
220. Posting of Susan Wojcicki, supra note 113; see also Danny Sullivan, Indexing Versus
Caching & How Google Print Doesn't Reprint, http://blog.searchenginewatch.comI/blogI051021-
113341 (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
221. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.
222. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 851 (suggesting that the critical element persuading the
court to hold thumbnail caching an unfair use was that there was a market for them as wallpapers
on cell phones in the United Kingdom).
223. Some examples are user groups, hyperlinks, and Web rings.
224. Vaidhyanathan, supra note 32.
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Google's project, either the courts or Congress should consider taking this
opportunity to do something new with copyright law.
B. Fair Use Modifications
The statistics in Part II indicate what courts have done previously, but the
question remains what they should do in the future. Copyright law is not infal-
lible and, as has happened repeatedly in the past, new technology reveals areas
in need of repair. Congress and the courts that handle the Google Book Search
lawsuit should consider patching these areas; the modifications below are
some possible options.
One modification that might be made is changing how courts handle Fac-
tor 3. It is clear, for example, that even though Factor 3 has a high correlation
with the end result, it is still not a real player in the analyses given the pre-
dominance of Factors 1 and 4.225 As discussed above in Part II.E, Factor 3
should not be merely a pass-fail test for defendants but should instead be rec-
ognized as a factor that favors fair use when only the proportion needed has
been used and the use is otherwise fair. Courts should go further, however.
Courts could, for example, treat Factor 3 as a blue-pencil opportunity.
226
Instead of denying an otherwise fair use because the use was not in proportion
to what is required, courts could issue conditional fair-use holdings-condi-
tioned on the defendant's using less of the work. If an infringing use would
qualify as a fair use but for the fact that the use took too much, the court could
prohibit its use and award any damages applicable while allowing future,
reduced use. For example, if Google were displaying entire works on its
results page, the court could prohibit such a display, award any damages, but
not prohibit Google from displaying three-line snippets of the works in the
future.
This adaptation would both make the court's task easier by reducing the
number of factors it must balance against each other, and it would also ensure
that otherwise-fair uses are not forbidden solely because a bit more than neces-
sary has been used. It also would address a somewhat curious problem: what
happens when only Factor 3 weighs against a fair use finding? Some courts
have allowed the use because the other factors all favored fair use.22 7 The
copyright holder would suffer in such an instance because the other factors
225. See, e.g., Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that
defendant's use was fair because it prevailed on Factor 4, even though it lost on Factor 3 and
others).
226. A "blue-pencil" approach, borrowed from contract law, is one where terms are "blue-
penciled" into a contract or "blue-penciled" out of it. Essentially, "blue-penciled" is just a term for
"modifying." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 183 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "blue-pencil test. A
judicial standard for deciding whether to invalidate the whole contract or only the offending
words.").
227. See, e.g., Duffy v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);
Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 238 (D. Del. 1998); see also list of
cases, supra Part I.A and note 68.
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would overwhelm Factor 3 in the analysis; blue-penciling would allow the
court to reduce the use to an appropriate amount.
Turning to another factor, the court might take this chance to craft new
tools to interpret Factor 4. Because Factor 4 receives so much weight in the
analysis, as the statistics and court opinions show, this would be a powerful
modification of the fair use analysis. Copyright, at its core, rewards creativity
and innovation. One such modification therefore is that the courts could begin
to treat "substantially innovative" uses as favoring Factor 4, as such creative
uses are unlikely to be thought of by copyright holders (that is, the uses are not
"traditional" or "likely to be developed"). If adopted, "innovation" should not
be given presumptive force because there may be cases where an innovative-
ness inquiry will not solve the issue. Saying that something is innovative is,
however, in effect saying that it is not "reasonable or likely to be [developed]"
because it is a creative thought that, by definition, others are unlikely to think
of.
Turning to Factor 2, it was previously noted that this factor draws a
distinction between factual and fictional works; this distinction is somewhat
odd in the fair use analysis. The fair use defense is, after all, only invoked
when a copyright-protected work is at issue. So why protect copyrighted fic-
tional works more than factual works, especially in so shorthand a manner as
giving it an entire factor? 228 It is certainly the case that different types receive
different fair use treatment: factual works are more prone to a finding of fair
use. 22 9 The argument for this theory consists of something like this: (1) factual
works are less expressive than creative works, (2) copyright protects only
expression, (3) fair use should be available more often to copiers of less
expressive works and thus (4) the fair use analysis should have a factor that
tips towards fair use when the works in question are factual. But isn't this
argument made of straw? Factual works may generally be less expressive (for
example, phone books) than creative works as a rule of thumb, but should that
really allow for a shorthand determination that factual works get less protec-
tion against fair use? The facts within those works get less (indeed, no) pro-
tection; but should expression in such works, such as it is, get less protection?
Thus, Factor 2 may inappropriately favor fictional works in a fair use analysis.
However, given the minimal weight it is accorded in the analysis, this may be
of little practical difference.
Another Factor 2 modification would be to broaden it to include the type-
consistency inquiry suggested above. 23 By allowing Factor 2 to favor uses
that are "ambivalent" towards fact-fiction distinctions, the fair use test would
228. It may be a simple answer or, perhaps, an a priori statement. Either way, courts have
not elaborated why those works that are "closer to the core of intended copyright protection,"
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994), deserve to win this factor if,
indeed, bright-line tests are to be eschewed.
229. "[R]aw facts may be copied at will. This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate"
because if facts could not be copied at will, copyright's goal of promoting science would be
frustrated. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991) (citing Baker
v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880)).
230. See discussion supra at Part ll.D.
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be better suited for situations like Google's. And, on the off-chance that a caf6
built out of copyright-protected works is ever opened, the test would be better
equipped to address it. More realistically, fair use would also be prepared for
the wave of type-blind technological innovations that Google' s use may herald
the arrival of.
Another possible modification-the most important contemplated here-
would be to give the benefit conferred on society by the use more weight in
the fair use arena. As discussed above, fair use presently does not require
contemplation of how beneficial a use is to the public.23' If copyright is truly
meant to reflect the balancing of author protection against societal advance-
ment, the two must be put on equal footing in the analysis. Author protection,
that is, economic gain, is given its own factor and, further escalating the dis-
232parity, it is Factor 4, arguably the most important in a court's consideration.
It may even have two factors, because Factor 1 contains the "commercial"
element. Societal benefit should be a required contemplation in the fair use
analysis and, to reflect the spirit of copyright's balancing goal, it should be
given equal weight as remuneration to the author. One way to accomplish this
is to put the analysis of public benefit in Factor 4. Under this approach, Factor
4 would either favor or disfavor fair use depending on the balance between
societal benefit and economic harm to the author. This approach has been rec-
ognized by both the Second 233 and Ninth Circuits.23 Another method would be
to give societal benefit its own factor and consider it in the aggregate analysis.
Here, it was analyzed under Factor 1, but this creates at least two problems.
First, it dilutes the potency of the "transformative" inquiry, which is arguably
the most important aspect of the Factor 1 analysis at present. Second, it also
adds another prong to the Factor 1, which is already the most complicated,
235
containing three other elements. So while considering societal benefit in
Factor 1 is preferable to not considering it at all, the Ninth Circuit's approach,
or giving societal benefit a factor of its own, is preferable. Without some
modification, the economic interest of the author is given a disproportionate
weight that is incongruent with copyright law's goals.
Turning from factor-specific suggestions to the aggregate fair use analy-
sis, it is worth noting that the factors should be considered in light of each
other but not unnecessarily conflated. As the Supreme Court in Campbell pre-
scribed, the four factors should not "be treated in isolation, one from another.
All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the pur-
poses of copyright." 236 But exploring and weighing them together does not
231. See discussion Part II.C.
232. See discussion Part I.F.
233. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981).
234. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 805-06 (9th Cir. 2003). The
Ninth Circuit has also analyzed societal benefit under the first prong. See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft
Corp., 336 F. 3d 811,820 (9th Cir. 2003); Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. Bleem, LLC., 214
F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2000).
235. The four elements are commercial use, transformative use, propriety of defendant's
behavior, and societal benefit. Supra note 82.
236. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
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require allowing, for example, an author's right to remuneration in a derivative
market under Factor 4 to influence the analysis of how beneficial a use is to
society under Factor 1.237 Each factor should be reviewed on its own merits
because a sure result when the factors are heavily mixed is confusion and
unpredictability. To borrow yet another metaphor from the Ghostbusters-
inspired title of this article, mixing the factors is "crossing the streams;"
generally, it's something to be avoided. 38 In more legalistic terms, it damages
the potency of each factor's analysis by allowing a subsequent or proceeding
factor to undercut it. This should be avoided because the factors will be com-
pared in the aggregate balancing: if Factor 1 will be compared to Factor 4 in
the final balancing test, why allow Factor 4 to also control the outcome of
Factor 1 even before balancing? Letting a factor reveal qualities of another
factor239 is one thing; letting it control it is another. The distinction is plainly
hair thin, but nonetheless useful.
Finally, turning back to Google's lawsuits, the Book Search illuminates a
more general conflict that could itself serve as an article topic: copyright law is
concerned primarily with the means, not the ends, of infringement while fair
use is addressed primarily to the ends. The right Google is infringing is the
right to copy (and, debatably, the right to prepare a derivative work). But it is
using these copies in an indirect manner; it is not selling the copies to users or
"rebroadcasting ' 240 the copyright-protected books in a digital format. Instead,
it is a convoluted, attenuated use: it mixes the copyright-protected works with
its own developed search engine and, through the utility that only this mix
brings, Google is able to sell advertising space on its Web page. The concern
is primarily over the means Google is using to do so: scanning books. Several
237. See, e.g., Hanratty, supra note 62. To respond to this specific claim, allowing Factors 1
(purpose and character of use) and 4 (effect on potential market) to conflate is problematic. All
Factor 4 offers as an analysis of societal benefit is that, if a right to compensation exists under it,
the societal benefit should still have to be paid for by the infringing user. While this juxtaposition
may fairly be made, it is more appropriate instead to note that societal gains favor fair or unfair
use and the impact on the potential market favors fair or unfair use. Then, the weight of each
factor is considered in an aggregate analysis of whether the use is fair. By keeping these analytical
steps distinct, the fair use analysis is both less error prone and more transparent. A second
alternative is to conduct this societal benefit analysis in Factor 4 and immediately juxtapose the
two. The end result is the same: public benefit is determined then economic harm and finally the
two are compared. Doing otherwise allows economic harm to the author to undercut Factor 1
while still ruling the day in Factor 4, an undesirable "double whammy" given the advance-the-arts,
pro-public purpose of copyright law.
238. Ghostbusters fans following the analogy of Google as Gozer from the movie might
point out that, if I hold true to my analogy, we should cross the streams here.
239. This occurs with Factor 3, for instance, revealing that an infringing use that copies and
distributes an entire work is likely to supersede that work in the original marketplace. This does
not really conflate the factors, but rather considers the aspect of the infringing use itself that
happens to be analyzed under Factor 3. Thus, Google Book Search copies the entire work-a
negative under Factor 3 until aligned with the concomitant need to use the whole work to
accomplish Google's (legitimate) purpose. If Google also made the entire work available
electronically, the Factor 3 elements (entire copying) would be relevant as well to Factor 4 and
tend to negate fair use.
240. See Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998).
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examples illustrate this oddity. 141 The ultimate point, however, is that only fair
use recognizes and protects the ends. Thus, if Google's end is something copy-
right should encourage, fair use alone can protect it.
Copyright law is fundamentally a question of who should be compensated
for what. It involves the ugly question "who should be paid for this thing the
defendant has made?" Sometimes, the answer will be the author. Other times,
the answer will be the defendant. But the inquiry must never be reduced to
"could the author be paid for this" because the answer will always be a
resounding yes. Google's use is a productive, societal-benefiting use that
should be encouraged and that is a hallmark of technological advancement:
"[e]veryone with a teenage kid is worried the younger generation may believe
that all knowledge is on Google .... But what this does ... is take [kids] to
Google, which takes [them] to the library.
242
If for some reason Google's use is deemed unfair under existing copyright
law, the law should change. One scholar has noted that "[c]opyright law is [a]
child of technology., 243 But if technology is copyright's father, societal benefit
is its mother. And like any legal framework aimed at advancing the public
interest, if it is unable to accommodate that goal, there is a problem that merits
reconstruction. Google's use raises innovative copyright concerns, but the
child must be mindful of its elders, learn from the marriage between its father
241. If Google had instead scanned the works into a database that returned only titles of
books, would that be an infringement? Google would in effect be using a copyright-protected
work for internal purposes that lead to a commercial product, but the user would never see those
works. In Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Azrak-Hamway International, Inc., a toy maker used a picture
of a toy in designing its own toy. 668 F.2d 699, 701 (2d Cir. 1982). This was permitted as de
minimis use. Id. at 703. Here, though de minimis is hard to accept given the systematic and
complete copying of works, the result is notable. Surely the fault in Google's use cannot be that it
is displaying snippets as search results.
What if Google had existed 100 years ago? Instead of a search engine, it might have invited
clients to write to it with the precise topics of inquiry (for example, search terms). Google could
then go to the library, read the books and then (after many hours of work) write back with snippets
of text and the titles of the works they came from. This looks like a fair use; is the dispositive
difference that in the instant case Google has made copies of the works? What if Google had simply
hired people to memorize entire books or make handwritten copies? The result is the same to the
author: why should the physical copying matter? Cf. Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for
the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 36-40 (1996) (arguing that while "copying" was an
acceptable proxy for assigning rights without overly curtailing public rights to access works, it is
much less so today because digital technology renders "copying" involved with nearly every use).
Consider finally a futuristic example. Google waits 100 years to offer this service. In the
future version, instead of copying the books, Google uses one of its orbital satellites to fire a beam
down that scans the contents of all of the books. No copy is made but the same product results as
under the current Book Search Project: search engine users can see snippets of the books the
Google satellite identified. Now the copying element has been removed from the question and
replaced with "beaming:" but is it a fair use?
242. Hafner, At Harvard, supra note 121, at Cl (quoting Sidney Verba) (internal quoting
omitted).
243. Paul Goldstein, Copyright in the New Information Age, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 829, 829
(1991).
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technology and mother society, and evolve in a way that still protects authors.
Denying access to a modern Library of Alexandria is no such evolution.
The dispute between Google and its in-court detractors is one over
compensation. The abstract question "who deserves to make money" is rarely
helpful to analysis. Authors and publishers currently deserve to be compen-
sated and to be compensated as well as capitalism provides. But their right to
compensation ceases somewhere. If that cessation is not at Google's funda-
mentally transformative use-if taking the components of a copyright-
protected work and using them in a completely different, society-benefiting
manner is not protected-then copyright law advances only one goal: copy-
right holders' profit pursuits. This death of the second goal, societal benefit,
would cripple the doctrine and something new would have to rise from its
ashes.
Copyright holders will benefit from Google's service-they will even
benefit monetarily through shared advertising revenues. This lawsuit is about
wanting more money than copyright holders are entitled to under copyright
law. While the law may at times protect such desires, it should not encourage
them. It is possible there could come a day when Google is a harbinger of
mass copyright infringement, a towering Copyright Destructor, but that day as
of yet lives only in the realm of fiction. Fortunately, copyright law is not con-
trolled by even three-hundred foot creatures of fiction. And, conveniently for
the judges sitting in the Southern District of New York, the facts are that the
law is on Google's side.
Google is not Gozer the Destructor; Google's use is a fair use.
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